Utah v. maestas : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
Utah v. maestas : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee.
Linda M. Jones; Lynn R. Brown; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. maestas, No. 960831 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/580
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TONY R. MAESTAS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 960831-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for Unlawful 
Distribution, Offering, Agreeing, Consenting or Arranging to 
Distribute a Controlled or Counterfeit Substance, a first degree 
felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1953 
as amended), and Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) 
(1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable William A. 
Thorne, Judge, presiding. 
LINDA M. JONES (5497) 
LYNN R. BROWN (0460) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC, 
424 E. 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 E. 300 South, 6th Floor 
P. 0. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorney for Appellee 
FILED 
Utah Court of Aooeals 
FEB 2Z j 
Julia D'ASesandro 
Clerk of the Court 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TONY R. MAESTAS, 
Defendant/Appe11ant 
Case No. 960831-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for Unlawful 
Distribution, Offering, Agreeing, Consenting or Arranging to 
Distribute a Controlled or Counterfeit Substance, a first degree 
felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (1953 
as amended), and Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) ' 
(1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable William A. 
Thome, Judge, presiding. 
LINDA M. JONES (54 97) 
LYNN R. BROWN (0460) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC, 
424 E. 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 E. 300 South, 6th Floor 
P. 0. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorney for Appellee 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 3 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . 4 
A. Maestas Was Charged with and Convicted of Drug-
Related Offenses. 4 
B. Private Counsel Failed to Perfect the Appeal. . . 5 
C. The Trial Court Revoked Probation. 5 
D. Maestas Initiated a Rule 65B Petition for Relief 
from Conviction and Extraordinary Writ Claiming 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and that His Right 
to Appeal Had Been Violated. 5 
E. As a Result of the Postconviction Filings, 
Maestas Was Re-sentenced in Order that He Could 
Pursue His Original Appeal. 5 
F. This Court Remanded the Matter to the Trial Court 
for Findings Pursuant to Rule 23B Regarding 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 6 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 6 
A. The Department of Corrections Initiated an 
Undercover Operation Targeting Dealers, Who Were 
Supplying Drugs to Inmates in the Prison; Maestas Was 
Not a Target of the Operation. 6 
B. During the Trial, Defense Counsel Failed to 
Impeach the State's Key Witness with Evidence that 
Had a Direct Impact on His Credibility. 8 
C. Maestas' Probation Was Revoked. 9 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING 
TO PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT HAD A DIRECT IMPACT ON 
WALDRON'S CREDIBILITY AS A WITNESS FOR THE STATE. . . 12 
A. INFORMATION CONCERNING WALDRON'S BACKGROUND 
WAS ADMISSIBLE TO IMPEACH HIS CREDIBILITY: 
HOWEVER, THE INFORMATION WAS NEVER PRESENTED TO 
THE JURY. 12 
B. GORDON PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL IN THAT HE FAILED TO CROSS-EXAMINE 
WALDRON ABOUT HIS CRIMES OF DISHONESTY AND 
ABOUT THE FAVORABLE TREATMENT HE RECEIVED 
APPROXIMATELY TWO WEEKS AFTER HIS INVOLVEMENT 
IN THE UNDERCOVER OPERATION. 16 
1. Evidence Concerning Waldron's Crimes of 
Dishonesty Was Admissible. 16 
2. Evidence Exposing the Favorable 
Treatment that Waldron Received in 
Connection with His Involvement in Ensuring 
Maestas' Arrest Was Relevant to Waldron's 
Motives for Testifying Against Maestas. . . 18 
3. Since Waldron Was the Only Witness to 
Link Maestas to the Transaction, Gordon's 
Failure to Place Waldron's Credibility in 
Issue Prejudiced Maestas. 22 
POINT II. THE FACTS FAIL TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDINGS THAT MAESTAS WILLFULLY VIOLATED 
PROBATION; THUS. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN REVOKING PROBATION. 24 
POINT III. THE ARREST IN THIS CASE VIOLATED UTAH 
LAW; CONSEQUENTLY, IT CANNOT SERVE TO SUPPORT THE 
SEARCH 32 
A. THE ARREST VIOLATED UTAH LAW. 34 
B. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IS APPLICABLE TO THIS 
CASE. 39 
C. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ISSUE WAS PROPERLY 
PRESERVED FOR APPEAL. 44 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
1. The Trial Court Committed Plain Error 
in Failing to Suppress Evidence Confiscated 
in Connection with the Warrantless Search. 
2. Trial Counsel Was Ineffective for 
Failing to Seek Suppression of the Evidence 
on the Basis that the Arrest Was Invalid. . 
CONCLUSION 
45 
48 
49 
Addendum A: 
Addendum B: 
Addendum C: 
Addendum D: 
Addendum E: 
Addendum F: 
Statutes and constitutional provisions 
Judgments of convictions, dated June 17, 1996 
Order granting Motion for Remand for 
Supplementation of the Record and for 
Determination of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 23B 
Findings of Fact 
Trial court's oral ruling revoking probation 
Waldron's trial testimony 
iii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Page 
Campbell v. Reed, 594 F.2d 4 (4th Cir. 1979) 19, 20 
Commonwealth v. Mason, 490 A.2d 421 (Pa. 
1985) 40 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) 17 
Jennings v. Oklahoma, 744 P.2d 212 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1987) 22 
Katz v. U.S. , 389 U.S. 347 (1967) 33 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) . 12 
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) 39 
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) 20, 23 
Pay ton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) 33 
Pvle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942) 19, 20 
State v. Archuleta, 812 P.2d 80 (Utah App. 
1991) 2, 25, 31, 32 
State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 
1993) 33 
State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988) 43, 44 
State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48 (Utah 1998) 3 
State v. Chestnut, 621 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980) 21, 23 
State v. Crestani, 771 P.2d 1085 (Utah App. 
1989) 18, 22 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) 45 
State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989) 45 1 
State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1987) . . . . 37, 38, 39, 
40, 41, 42, 
44, 46 
i 
iv 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
State v. Gallecros, 355 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah 
App. 1998) 1 
State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991) 33 
State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350 (Utah 1996) 18 
State v. Hodges. 798 P.2d 270 (Utah App. 
1990) 25, 29, 30, 
31, 32 
State v. Huggins, 920 P.2d 1195 (Utah App. 
1996) 2, 13, 18 
State v. James, 361 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 9 (Utah 
App. 1999) 33 
State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798 (Utah 1990) 2 
State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981) 6 
State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996) 4 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) 33 
State v. Larsen, 876 P.2d 391 (Utah App. 
1994) 16 
State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650 (Utah 1985) . . . 17, 19, 21 
State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205 (Utah App. 
1991) 2 
State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203 (Utah 1976) 12 
State v. Northrup. 756 P.2d 1288 (Utah 
App. 1988) 33 
State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied. 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993) 4 
State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977) 16 
State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989 (Utah App. 
1994) 2, 31 
State v. Ramirez. 814 P.2d 1131 (Utah App. 
1991) 34 
v 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
State v. Ribe. 876 P.2d 403 (Utah App. 1994) 40 
State v. Ross. 782 P.2d 529 (Utah App. 1989) 16 
State v. Rowe. 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992) 41, 42 
State v. Ruesaa. 851 P.2d 1229 (Utah App. 
1993) 32 
State v. Simmons, 866 P.2d 614 (Utah App. 
1993) 43 
State v. Snvder. 860 P.2d 351 (Utah App. 
1993) 49 
State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810 (Utah App. 
1994) 1 
State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990) . . . 12, 18, 23 
State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 
1993) 49 
State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296 (Utah App. 
1991) 2 
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984) . . 12, 17, 18, 
48 
U.S. v. Sutton. 542 F.2d 1239 (4th Cir. 1976) . . . . . . 20 
U.S. v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) 39 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (1953 as 
amended) 4 v 
Utah Code Ann. § 5 8 - 3 7 - 8 ( 2 ) ( a ) ( i ) (1953 a s 
amended) 4 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2-101, et. seq. (1993) . . . . . . 17, 22 
< 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 64-13-1, et. seq. (1986 
& Supp. 1992) 4, 37, 38 
vi 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-1(8) (Supp. 1992) 35 
Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-6 (Supp. 1992) 35 
Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-10 (Supp. 1992) 36 
Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-12 (Supp. 1992) 36 
Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-21.5 (1993) 35, 36 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (1996) 36 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-la-l (Supp. 1992) 36, 37 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-la-2 (1990) 36, 37 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1994) 4 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10) (a) (i) (Supp. 
1994) 29 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) 1 
Utah R. App. P. 23B (1997) 1, 6, 10, 
13, 14, 20 
Utah R. Crim. P. 65B (1996) 5, 6, 48 
Utah R. Evid. 403 (1993) 16 
Utah R. Evid. 607 (1993) 16 
Utah R. Evid. 609 (1993) 16 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 4, 32, 33, 
39, 44 
U.S. Const, amend. VI 4, 12, 23 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12 4, 12, 23 
Utah Const, art. I, § 14 4, 33 
vii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TONY R. MAESTAS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 960831-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
1. Whether trial counsel for Appellant Tony Maestas 
("Maestas") was ineffective for failing to investigate and 
present evidence at trial that would impeach the credibility of 
the state's key witness, Tony Waldron, including evidence of his 
criminal history and evidence of the favorable treatment he 
received shortly after Maestas' arrest. 
Standard of Review: "When, as in this case, the claim of 
ineffective assistance is raised for the first time on appeal, we 
resolve the issue as a matter of law." State v. Gallecros. 355 
Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Strain, 
885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994)). Also, "where the trial 
court has held a Rule 23B hearing and made specific findings 
relevant to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim," this 
Court will "defer to the trial court's findings of fact," and 
then "apply the appropriate legal principles to the facts and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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decide, for the first time on appeal, whether the defendant re-
ceived ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the 
Sixth Amendment." State v. Hugcrins, 920 P. 2d 1195, 1198 (Utah 
App. 1996) (cites omitted). 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
revoking Maestas1 probation, where the state failed to present 
evidence that the alleged probation violation was willful. 
Standard of Review: 
"The decision to grant, modify, or revoke probation is in 
the discretion of the trial court." State v. Jameson, 800 
P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990); accord State v. Archuleta, 812 
P.2d 80, 82 (Utah App. 1991). Thus, in order to prevail in 
this case, defendant "must show that the evidence of a 
probation violation, viewed in a light most favorable to the 
trial court's findings, is so deficient that the trial court 
abused its discretion in revoking defendant's probation." 
Jameson, 800 P.2d at 804 (footnote omitted); Archuleta, 812 
P.2d at 82. Moreover, a trial court's finding of a proba-
tion violation is a factual one and therefore must be given 
deference on appeal unless the finding is clearly erroneous. 
State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 208-09 (Utah App. 1991). 
State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah App. 1994). 
3. Whether the arrest, which did not comply with Utah law, 
was illegal, thereby invalidating the search incident to arrest. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to admit 
evidence seized as a result of a search implicating a defendant's 
Fourth Amendment right is a "mixed question of law and fact [] 
appropriately resolved under a bifurcated examination of, first, 
the predicate historical facts found by the trial court, weighed 
against a clearly erroneous standard, and, second, of the 
emerging legal conclusion, evaluated for correctness." State v. 
Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1298 (Utah App. 1991) (cites omitted). 
2 
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PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
Maestas has raised the first issue in the context of an 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Ineffective assistance 
of counsel may be reviewed for the first time on direct appeal by 
this Court where defendant is "represented by new counsel on 
appeal," and the record is adequate to review the claim. State v. 
Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). Maestas has met those 
requirements in this matter. 
The second issue, the probation-revocation matter, was 
preserved in the record on appeal in District Court Case No. 
921901600 (hereinafter "R.") at 601-655; 740-41. 
The third issue concerning the legality of the arrest was 
preserved in the record on appeal in District Court Case No. 
950902479 (hereinafter "Case No. 950902479") at 160-162. The 
trial court agreed to allow Maestas to file papers concerning the 
matter in order to properly preserve the issue for purposes of 
appeal. (R. 686-88; 690; 718; 730.) However, notwithstanding 
requests by the defense to rule on the merits of the matter, the 
trial judge declined to do so and ruled that Maestas would not be 
allowed to have the issue resolved before sentencing; according 
to the re-sentencing judge, the issue would have to go to the 
Court of Appeals for resolution. (R. 734-35.) Thus, in the 
alternative, Maestas has raised the third issue on appeal in the 
context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, see 
Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50 (this Court may review matter for the 
first time on direct appeal), and under the plain error doctrine. 
3 
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See State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 342 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 
868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993); State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 
1996) (appellate court will address issue raised for the first 
time on appeal under the plain error doctrine). 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following rules, statutes and constitutional provisions 
will be determinative of the issues on appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 64-13-1 et. seq. (1986 & Supp. 1992) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1994) 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12 
Utah Const, art. I, § 14 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
U.S. Const, amend. VI 
The text of those provisions is contained in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition in the Court Below. 
A. Maestas Was Charged with and Convicted of Drug-Related 
Offenses. 
In March 1992, Maestas was charged with unlawful 
distribution of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a 
public school, a First Degree Felony offense in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1953 as amended), and unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance, a Third Degree Felony 
offense in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1953 
as amended). (R. 6-7.) Maestas was represented by private 
counsel during the proceedings. (R. 25.) The case went to trial 
4 
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in April 1993 (R. 42, 73), and the jury found Maestas guilty on 
both charges. (R. 69-72.) Judgment was entered against Maestas 
(R. 104-06), and the judge stayed the prison sentence and ordered 
Maestas to serve probation. (R. 138-39.) 
B. Private Counsel Failed to Perfect the Appeal. 
In June 1993, private counsel filed a notice of appeal in 
this case (R. 76-77), but failed to take any further action in 
connection with the appeal. In June 1994, this Court dismissed 
the appeal. (R. 109; 123-24.) 
C. The Trial Court Revoked Probation. 
Thereafter, the state filed an order to show cause why 
probation should not be revoked. In September 1994 the trial 
court revoked probation and Maestas was sent to prison to serve 
his sentence. (R. 146-48; 152-53.) 
D. Maestas Initiated a Rule 65B Petition for Relief from 
Conviction and Extraordinary Writ Claiming Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel and that His Right to Appeal Had Been 
Violated. 
In October 1994, Maestas filed a second notice of appeal (R. 
150), which apparently was dismissed on Maestas1 own motion (see 
R. documents unnumbered in pleadings file between 155 and 157). 
In addition, in April 1995, Maestas commenced an action by filing 
a Verified Rule 65B Petition for Relief from Conviction and Ex-
traordinary Writ, wherein he asserted, among other things, that 
his right to appeal had been violated by counsel's failure to 
perfect and pursue the appeal. (See Case No. 950902479.) 
E. As a Result of the Postconviction Filings, Maestas Was 
Re-sentenced in Order that He Could Pursue His Original 
Appeal. 
5 
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In 1996, the trial court consolidated matters relevant to 
the trial and raised in the Rule 65B proceedings with the 
original criminal action. Thereafter, Maestas was re-sentenced. 
(Case No. 950902479 at 146, 154, 156-64; also R. 174-77.) In 
accordance with Utah law, Maestas is appealing from the judgments 
of conviction dated June 17, 1996 (R. 175-78), and attached as 
Addendum B. See State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 37-38 (Utah 1981) 
(if defendant was misled in believing that appeal was being taken 
and such time lapsed to prevent defendant from pursuing appeal, 
he should be re-sentenced in the matter nunc pro tunc so as to 
afford him an opportunity to timely perfect an appeal). 
F. This Court Remanded the Matter to the Trial Court for 
Findings Pursuant to Rule 23B Regarding Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel. 
In June 1997, this Court granted Maestas1 Motion for Remand 
for Supplementation of the Record and for Determination of 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel pursuant to Rule 23B, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and ordered that the case be 
remanded to the trial court for findings regarding the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. A copy of that order is 
attached hereto as Addendum C. Consistent with the Rule 23B 
remand, Findings were entered in the trial court, and are 
attached hereto as Addendum D. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The Department of Corrections Initiated an Undercover 
Operation Targeting Dealers, Who Were Supplying Drugs to 
Inmates in the Prison; Maestas Was Not a Target of the 
Operation. 
6 
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Officials from the Department of Corrections ("DOC") engaged 
in a clandestine operation to determine the source of unlawful 
drugs going into the Utah State Prison. (R. 3 68; 3 84.) The 
officers arranged for an inmate, Tony Waldron, to make contact 
with specific persons outside the facility, who officers believed 
had been supplying drugs to individuals in the prison.(See R. 
255; 358-59; 374.) DOC officials had a list of four or five 
suppliers who Waldron would contact. (R. 385.) Nothing in the 
record supports that Maestas was on that list. 
Indeed, the record supports that officials and Waldron did 
not consider Maestas to be a target of the operation. 
Correctional officers admitted that the operation "had nothing to 
do with Maestas." (R. 239; see also 266-68; 362-63; 385.) Like-
wise, the trial judge in this case found that Maestas1 in-
volvement in the matter was "an accidental happening." (R. 284.) 
On the day of the transaction, Waldron made contact with two 
women who were to line him up with a targeted supplier. (R. 
233.) The women attempted to make contact with the supplier by 
telephone and pager, but were unsuccessful. (R. 234; 239; 361-
62.) Thereafter, the women indicated they may be able to buy 
drugs from Maestas.(R. 234; 362-63.) Although the DOC had no 
reason to involve Maestas in the matter, there was no effort to 
refocus the operation to its intended purpose, and no effort to 
involve local law enforcement. Rather, Waldron and the women 
found Maestas, and according to evidence presented at trial, 
purchased drugs. (R. 234-35; 363; 376-77.) 
7 
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Thereafter, as Maestas and a second person left in Maestas' 
car from the apartment where the transaction allegedly occurred, 
correctional officials followed and engaged overhead lights to 
pull Maestas over to the side of the road. (R. 270.) 
Investigator Sundguist arrested Maestas and searched Maestas and 
the car. (R. 271; 273.) According to Sundquist, in connection 
with the search, he confiscated approximately $3 85 in cash, a 
white powdery substance, and an additional substance that 
Sundquist found in Maestas1 pockets. (R. 271.) Maestas was 
charged with one count each of unlawful distribution and unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance. (R. 006-007.) 
B. During the Trial, Defense Counsel Failed to Impeach the 
State's Key Witness with Evidence that Had a Direct Impact 
on his Credibility. 
The case went to trial. (See R. 295-503.) During cross-
examination of Waldron, defense counsel failed to inquire into 
matters impugning Waldron's chairacter. (R. 3 74-83.) Specifically, 
Waldron had been convicted of several counts of forgery, 
aggravated assault by a prison inmate and felony fleeing; his 
history included additional forgery-related convictions; he was 
suspected of smuggling drugs into the prison and had a history of 
i 
hiding drugs on his person and otherwise possessing drugs while 
in the prison; he was found to have injection sites on his arm; 
and Waldron was never charged or disciplined in connection with a 
1 
drug smuggling investigation that began in the prison in November 
1991. (R. 784-89.) Waldron was given a parole date of January 
1993. (R. 785.) Yet, approximately two weeks after Waldron's 
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involvement in the alleged transaction with Maestas, Waldron was 
paroled from prison. Waldron was paroled 9 months earlier than 
scheduled, on April 2, 1992. (R. 786.) 
C. Maestas' Probation Was Revoked. 
In April 1993, the jury found Maestas guilty of the offenses 
as charged (R. 69, 70), and the judge stayed the prison sentence 
for 3 6 months while Maestas served probation in the Odyssey House 
program. (R. 104-06.) 
Thereafter, on June 23, 1994, Adult Probation and Parole 
filed a Progress/Violation Report with the court alleging that 
Maestas had "become suicidal, homicidal, and had begun attacking 
staff and personnel at Odyssey House." (R. 110.) In response, 
the court issued a warrant for Maestas' arrest and ordered him to 
show cause why probation should not be revoked. (R. 112-18.) 
The order to show cause alleged the following: 
[D]efendant has failed to participate and comply to the 
conditions set forth by the Odyssey House program, which 
resulted in his removal from said program on June 23, 1994, 
in violation of condition number 11.5 of the defendant's 
Probation Agreement and the Court's order. 
(R. 118.) At the order to show cause hearing the evidence 
reflected that on "a couple of different occasions," Maestas 
indicated that he wanted to kill himself. (R. 615.) He was 
placed on a suicide watch and eventually taken to the University 
of Utah Hospital emergency room because of the "ideation" he had 
"about hurting himself, running in the street, letting someone 
run over him." (R. 616.) 
The clinical director of the Odyssey House program, Tracy 
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Anderson, told Maestas to let him know if Maestas continued 
having suicidal thoughts; if Maestas continued, he would not be 
allowed to stay in the program "because [Odyssey House was] not a 
psychiatric setting" and was not equipped to handle the matter. 
(R. 616-19.) 
Anderson acknowledged that Maestas did not violate a "hard" 
rule at Odyssey House; rather, Maestas was notified that he could 
not engage in "suicide gesturing" since the program was not set 
up to deal with that. (R. 624-25.) During the hearing, the 
court asked the Odyssey House counselor, Albert Nieto, if he 
perceived Maestas' conduct as manipulation. The counselor 
believed that initially it was, but as it continued, he did not 
believe Maestas was manipulative. (R. 632-33.) Also, Nieto 
acknowledged that Odyssey House failed to substantiate certain 
medical problems suffered by Maestas until after Maestas 
complained about them, and that the problems were not being 
attended to. (R 633-34.) 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ruled that 
"there has been a violation of the terms of the conditions of 
probation. That violation was knowing and intentional under 
circumstances where the defendant had the ability to comply with 
the Court's order on the conditions of probation. Therefore 
probation will be revoked." (R. 653.) A copy of the trial 
court's order is attached hereto as Addendum E. This appeal and 
a 23B remand proceeding followed as set forth in the Statement of 
the Case, supra. 
i 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Maestas1 trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of 
counsel by failing to present evidence at trial directly 
impacting on the credibility of the state's key witness, Tony 
Waldron. The evidence concerned Waldron's crimes of dishonesty 
and the favorable treatment he received shortly after his 
involvement in securing Maestas' arrest in this matter. Defense 
counsel likely failed to present the evidence because he was 
unaware of it, thereby supporting the determination that he was 
also ineffective for failing to conduct an investigation in this 
case. Waldron was the only witness to provide direct evidence 
against Maestas of criminal conduct. Defense counsel's failure to 
present the credibility evidence prejudiced Maestas. 
The state presented insufficient evidence in this case to 
support the determination that Maestas willfully violated his 
probation. Rather, the evidence supported that Maestas suffered 
mental health issues that were beyond his control and not 
treatable in the Odyssey House program. The trial court abused 
its discretion in revoking Maestas' probation. 
Finally, the DOC exceeded the scope of its statutory 
authority when it engaged in the undercover operation and arrest 
in this case involving Maestas. As a result of exceeding the 
statutory authority, the officers' arrest of Maestas was illegal. 
The illegal arrest cannot serve to justify the warrantless search 
under the incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment. 
This case should be reversed and remanded on that basis. 
11 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO 
PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT HAD A DIRECT IMPACT ON WALDRON'S 
CREDIBILITY AS A WITNESS FOR THE STATE, 
The Sixth Amendment and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the right to 
assistance of counsel. The right to counsel has been construed 
to be "the right to effective assistance of counsel." McMann v. 
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970); accord State v. 
McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976). The Court in Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), set forth the proper test for 
determining whether counsel's performance was ineffective: 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance 
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made 
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing 
that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 
Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said 
that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a 
breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result 
unreliable. 
Id. at 687; accord State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 
1990). In this case, defense counsel's performance was deficient 
in that he failed to cross-examine the state's key witness with 
evidence that had a direct impact on the witness' credibility. 
A. INFORMATION CONCERNING WALDRON'S BACKGROUND WAS 
ADMISSIBLE TO IMPEACH HIS CREDIBILITY: HOWEVER, THE 
INFORMATION WAS NEVER PRESENTED TO THE JURY. 
The state's key witness, Tony Waldron, testified that 
Maestas sold cocaine to him for $100. (R. 376-77.) Waldiron 
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described the transaction to correctional officers through a wire 
that he was wearing, and he identified Maestas to officers as the 
supplier for purposes of the arrest. (R. 377.) During cross-
examination, counsel for the defense, Victor Gordon, failed to 
introduce evidence of Waldron's criminal background, which 
included convictions for crimes of dishonesty, and motive for 
Waldron's involvement in ensuring Maestas' arrest and conviction. 
Gordon likely failed to introduce the evidence because he was 
unaware of it, supporting the determination that Gordon failed to 
investigate the matter. Gordon's failures constitute ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel, as set forth below. 
Specifically, with respect to Waldron's criminal background, 
Gordon failed to introduce into evidence information concerning 
Waldron's crimes of dishonesty and other matters that would im-
peach his credibility. A copy of that portion of the trial 
transcript containing Waldron's testimony is attached hereto as 
Addendum F. As a result of those failures, Maestas requested 
remand of this matter in order to supplement the record with 
findings of fact regarding Waldron's criminal history. (See 
Addendum C hereto.) "In a situation where the trial court has 
held a Rule 23B hearing and made specific findings relevant to an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we defer to the trial 
court's findings of fact." State v. Huggins, 920 P. 2d 1195, 1198 
(Utah App. 1996) (cites omitted). 
On remand, the trial court found that Waldron's prison file 
reflected the following: Waldron was committed to the prison in 
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1990 in connection with convictions for two counts of forgery, 
second degree felony offenses (R. 792). Waldron's record 
consisted of 9 additional felony convictions for forgery and one 
felony conviction for fraud. An assessment in Waldron's prison 
file dated 1987 reflected that Waldron "cannot be trusted at all" 
and the file showed that in 1987, 1988 and 1989, Waldron was 
involved in smuggling drugs into the prison and disciplined for 
possession and use of controlled substances. (R. 793; 794.) In 
October 1990, Waldron asked to participate in narcotics 
operations and was rejected on the basis that ""it would not be 
wise to allow him to participate' because of his history of drug 
dependency and attempted escape." (Id.) 
As of November 26, 1991, Waldron was under investigation for 
suspicion of smuggling drugs from the prison dairy into the D 
block. On February 21, 1992, Waldron was discovered to have 
injection sites on his arm. (R. 792.) Waldron's history presented 
credibility issues that should have been brought to the jury's 
attention during the trial of this matter. 
With respect to evidence of motive, during the 23B remand in 
this case, the trial judge found that prior to March 14, 1992, 
Waldron was scheduled to be released from prison on January 14, 
1993. (R. 792.) On March 14, 1992, Waldron was recruited to 
participate in the undercover operation, which resulted in 
Maestas' arrest. (R. 793.) On April 2, 1992, "a Special Attention 
Hearing was held by the Board of Pardons. A Special Attention 
Hearing is a review to grant relief to inmates under special 
( 
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circumstances where a change of status may be warranted." (R. 
793.) Such a hearing may be initiated by the receipt of a writ-
ten request indicating that special circumstances exist for which 
a change in status may be warranted. Waldron was paroled on that 
day. Waldron's parole occurred nine months earlier than sche-
duled. At the time of his parole, Waldron was serving sentences 
for felony offenses consisting of forgery and fraud. (R. 793.) 
In July 1992, Waldron was back in custody. (R. 794.) In the 
fall of 1992, Waldron was convicted of forgery, aggravated 
assault by a prisoner and felony fleeing. (R. 794.) 
During the trial of this matter in April 1993, the 
prosecutor asked Waldron if he was "presently an inmate at the 
Utah State Prison," to which Waldron responded, "Yes, I am." (R. 
374.) The prosecutor then asked, "Directing your attention to 
the 14th of March of 1992, were you an inmate on that date?" 
Waldron answered, "Yes, I was." (R. 374.) During cross 
examination, Waldron indicated that in connection with his 
involvement in the undercover operation, correctional officers 
promised they would write a letter of "good recommendation to the 
board," and "that was it." (R. 379.) Neither the prosecutor nor 
Waldron disclosed that Waldron actually was released on parole 
nine months ahead of schedule and within approximately two weeks 
of his participation in the undercover operation. In fact, the 
prosecutor's examination improperly suggested that Waldron had 
not been released. 
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B. GORDON PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN 
THAT HE FAILED TO CROSS-EXAMINE WALDRON ABOUT HIS CRIMES OF 
DISHONESTY AND ABOUT THE FAVORABLE TREATMENT HE RECEIVED 
APPROXIMATELY TWO WEEKS AFTER HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE 
UNDERCOVER OPERATION. 
1. Evidence Concerning Waldron's Crimes of Dishonesty Was 
Admissible. 
It is fundamental that pursuant to the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, "the credibility of a party may be attacked by any 
party." Utah R. Evid 607 (1993). Further, for the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness 
has been convicted of a crime involving dishonesty or a false 
statement is admissible, and is not subject to the general 
balancing considerations of Rule 403. Utah R. Evid. 609(a) (1) 
and (2) (1993); State v. Ross, 782 P.2d 529, 531 (Utah App. 1989). 
Evidence of a witness' prior conviction may be presented 
through the oral testimony of the witness or by presenting the 
court record of such conviction. State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 
1387, 1390 (Utah 1977). In this case, evidence of Waldron's 
crimes of forgery involved dishonesty and would have been 
automatically admissible to impugn Waldron's credibility. See 
Ross, 782 P.2d at 531. Likewise, evidence concerning Waldron's 
fraud conviction was admissible since the crime involved 
dishonesty or a false statement. See State v. Larsen, 876 P.2d 
391, 395 (Utah App. 1994). 
During the trial in this matter, Gordon failed to impugn 
Waldron's character with the important and admissible credibility 
evidence. Since " [c]ross-examination is the principal means by 
which the believability of a witness and the truth of his 
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testimony are tested," State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650, 655 (Utah 
1985) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974)), 
Gordon's deficient performance was "so serious that counsel was 
not functioning as the "counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Indeed, Waldron 
was the state's key witness; he was the only person to provide 
evidence directly linking Maestas to the alleged transaction. 
Gordon's cross-examination necessarily should have involved 
exposing Waldron's crimes of dishonesty. 
While the record fails to support a tactical reason for 
Gordon's failure to impeach Waldron's credibility, the record 
suggests that Gordon failed to introduce the credibility evidence 
on cross-examination because he was unaware of Waldron's criminal 
history. That is, Gordon failed to discover the information. 
Such a failure constitutes ineffective assistance of 
counsel. The record supports that even though Gordon would have 
known that Waldron was an inmate at the time that Waldron 
participated in the undercover operation, Gordon did not 
investigate why Waldron was serving time in prison. Such an 
investigation should have been obvious to Gordon. In addition, 
the information was readily available. For example, Gordon could 
have reviewed court records concerning Waldron's convictions or 
discovered the information pursuant to the Government Records 
Access and Management Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2-101, et. seq. 
(1993). (See R. 792 (records concerning Waldron's history were 
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discoverable through GRAMA).) 
As a matter of law, failure to investigate constitutes 
ineffective assistance of counsel., A trial counsel's decision 
not to investigate the underlying facts of a case cannot be 
considered a valid tactical decision. Huggins, 920 P. 2d at 
1198/ State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 356 (Utah 1996) (""a 
decision not to investigate cannot be considered a tactical 
decision1") (quoting Templin, 805 P.2d at 188). ""[T]he Sixth 
Amendment imposes on counsel a duty to investigate, because 
reasonably effective assistance must be based on professional 
decisions [,] and informed legal choices can be made only after 
investigation of options.'" State v. Crestani, 771 P.2d 1085, 
1090 (Utah App. 1989) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 680). 
The lack of important cross-examination in this case 
supports the determination that Maestas' trial counsel did not 
investigate the matter. ""[C]ounsel has a duty to make reason-
able investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes 
particular investigations unnecessary.'" Huggins, 920 P.2d at 
1199 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91) . In this case, the 
failure to investigate lead to the failure to expose Waldron's 
history of dishonesty. Gordon's performance was deficient. 
2. Evidence Exposing the Favorable Treatment that Waldron 
Received in Connection with His Involvement in Ensuring 
Maestas' Arrest Was Relevant to Waldron's Motives for 
Testifying Against Maestas. 
Evidence that the witness had a motive for participating in 
the matter and testifying against the defendant is relevant to 
18 
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the cross-examination. The Utah Supreme Court has "repeatedly 
recognized the critical effect that a fact finder's perception of 
a witness1 bias may have on the outcome of a case." Leonard, 707 
P.2d at 654 (cites omitted). In this case, Gordon elicited 
testimony that Waldron had assisted officers in undercover 
operations in the past, resulting in no arrests. Officers 
claimed that Waldron was "0 for 3." (R. 398.) The evidence 
supports that Waldron may have felt pressure to supply 
information that would lead to an arrest. Yet, Waldron stated 
during direct examination that the only benefit he received as a 
result of his participation in the operation was a 
"recommendation" from the Department of Corrections to the Board 
of Pardons & Parole. (R. 379.) 
In fact, Waldron was released from prison approximately two 
weeks from the date of his involvement in the undercover 
operation. (R. 793.) His release was nine months ahead of 
schedule. (R. 792-93.) Waldron never disclosed that he was 
actually paroled early, and the prosecutor allowed the improper 
suggestion to go to the jury that Waldron did not receive parole. 
The prosecutor specifically did not correct the suggestion left 
by his examination that Waldron was in prison from March 1992 to 
the date of trial. 
"It is well settled that deliberate deception of a court and 
jurors by the presentation of known false evidence cannot be 
reconciled with the rudimentary demands of justice." Campbell v. 
Reed/ 594 F.2d 4, 7 (4th Cir. 1979) (citing Pvle v. Kansas, 317 
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U.S. 213 (1942)) (emphasis added). "The same result obtains when 
the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to 
go uncorrected when it appears." Id. (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 
360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)). Here, "the prosecution allowed a 
false impression to be created at trial when the truth would have 
directly impugned the veracity of its key witness." Campbell, 
594 F.2d at 8 (citing U.S. v. Sutton, 542 F.2d 1239, 1243 (4th 
Cir. 1976)) . 
The false impressions were allowed in this case to go 
uncorrected because Gordon failed to raise the matter to the 
trial court's attention. Gordon's failures constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition, Gordon failed to 
present evidence that Waldron was released from prison 
approximately two weeks after his direct involvement in the 
operation resulting in Maestas' arrest and ultimate conviction. 
Such evidence would have supported the determination that Waldron 
was motivated to implicate Maestas in the transaction in order to 
curry favor with the Department of Corrections and the Board of 
Pardons and Parole. 
Evidence presented in the 23B hearing reflects that officers 
promised that a letter of good recommendation would be provided 
to the Board of Pardons "in exchange for [Waldron's] cooperation 
on an investigation that resulted in the arrest and conviction of 
Tony Maestas." (R. 783, Exhibit 6 (emphasis added).) "Mr. Waldron 
was told that if the information that he provided was accurate 
and led to the arrest and conviction of individuals that were 
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trafficking narcotics into the Utah State Prison, a favorable 
recommendation would be written on his behalf to the Board of 
Pardons & Paroles." (R. 783, Exhibit 6 (emphasis added).) 
Since the favorable treatment hinged on Waldron providing 
information that was accurate, it was all the more imperative for 
Waldron to maintain that Maestas was involved in a drug 
transaction at the apartment. Waldron had a motive to see the 
matter through with his testimony that Maestas sold drugs to him. 
Waldron was motivated to provide information that would "result" 
in an arrest and conviction. Only in that instance would the 
Department of Corrections provide the letter facilitating the 
early release. Those facts were important to the defense. 
Maestas was entitled to cross-examine Waldron with respect 
to his motives and the special treatment Waldron received so soon 
after Maestas1 arrest. See State v. Chestnut, 621 P.2d 1228, 1233 
(Utah 1980); see also Leonard, 707 P.2d at 654. "The exposure of 
a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important 
function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-
examination. " Chestnut, 621 P.2d at 1233. 
Again, nothing in the record supports that Gordon had a 
tactical reason for failing to correct the incorrect impression, 
or failing to disclose that Waldron was released from prison so 
soon after his involvement in the undercover operation. Rather, 
the record supports that Gordon failed to present evidence 
regarding the matter because he was unaware of the facts. Gordon 
apparently failed to investigate the records reflecting Waldron's 
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incarceration. A "blatant lack of investigation indicates a 
severe deficiency in the performance of trial counsel." Crestani. 
771 P.2d at 1090 (quoting Jennings v. Oklahoma, 744 P.2d 212, 214 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1987)). As set forth above, Point I.B.I., 
failure to investigate constitutes ineffective assistance of 
counsel since the failure cripples counsel's ability to make 
intelligent choices about the presentation of evidence, and 
strategic choices at trial. 
In this matter, the necessary investigation should have been 
obvious to Gordon. In addition, the information was readily 
available. For example, Gordon could have discovered the 
information pursuant to the Government Records Access and 
Management Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2-101, et. seq. (1993). 
(See R. 792.) Because Gordon failed to investigate Waldron's 
history, he failed to present important credibility evidence at 
trial. Gordon's performance was so seriously deficient that 
counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 
3. Since Waldron Was the Only Witness to Link Maestas to 
the Transaction, Gordon's Failure to Place Waldron's 
Credibility in Issue Prejudiced Maestas. 
Maestas is required to show that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's 
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the ability to 
attack a witness' credibility on cross-examination is an 
important part of the right of confrontation, guaranteed by 
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Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, and the Sixth 
Amendment of the federal constitution. Chestnut, 621 P.2d at 
1233. An attack on credibility means an attack on the substance 
of the witness' testimony. Also, "[t]he jury's estimate of the 
truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be 
determinative of guilt or innocence." Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 
264, 269 (1959). 
Here, Waldron's testimony was extremely important since he 
was the only witness to directly link Maestas to the drug trans-
action. An attack on Waldron's credibility as a witness and on 
his motives would have had an important impact on the jury. 
In Tempiin, 805 P.2d at 188, the Utah Supreme Court 
considered defense counsel's failure to investigate the 
availability and testimony of certain witnesses, who would have 
presented information impacting on the credibility of the state's 
key witness. There, the Court ruled that the information was 
important because the key witness was the only person to offer 
"direct evidence of defendant's guilt." Id. "In reviewing this 
testimony, it is important to note that because it affects the 
credibility of the only witness who gave direct evidence of 
defendant's guilt, the testimony affects the "entire evidentiary 
picture.'" Id. 
Likewise, in this matter, the jury's verdict might have been 
different had the jury known the extent of Waldron's character 
for dishonesty and the extent of his motivation to implicate 
Maestas in the transaction. This case should be reversed and re-
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manded for a new trial since counsel's performance was deficient. 
POINT II. THE FACTS FAIL TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDINGS THAT MAESTAS WILLFULLY VIOLATED PROBATION; THUS, 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REVOKING PROBATION. 
After the conviction in this matter, the trial court ordered 
that it would stay Maestas' prison sentence in order that Maestas 
may participate in a rehabilitation program. The minute entry 
reflecting that order states the following: "The court defers 
sentencing until the defendant can be evaluated by Odyssey House 
to determine if he is appropriate for this program. If the 
defendant does not meet Odyssey House treatment program's 
criteria for acceptance for the program, then Mr. Gordon is 
instructed by this court to find another alternative program 
which will meet Judge Murphy's approval." (R. 98; see also 101.) 
Thereafter, Odyssey House accepted Maestas as a candidate 
for the program (R. 594) and the judge stayed the prison sentence 
on the following terms and conditions: 
The period of probation will be 36 months. During the 36 
months you are to pay the fine, the surcharge, and any 
restitution, and there may not be any, in accordance with 
the schedule set up with Adult Probation and Parole. 
You are to enter into and complete the Odyssey House 
program and any after-care. You're not to use any unlawful 
drugs. You are not [to] associate with persons who 
unlawfully use or who are known to unlawfully distribute or 
use drugs. 
You are not to frequent places where drugs are known to 
be distributed or used. You are to submit your person to 
testing for the presence of unlawful drugs in your blood-
stream. [You are] to submit your person, your effects, your 
residence to search and seizure for the unlawful drugs. 
You are to serve eleven months in the Salt Lake County 
Jail. I set that at eleven months just so I can comply with 
consent decree or assist the county in complying with the 
consent [decree]. But it should be noted specifically that 
you are to be released to AP&P for transportation to the 
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Odyssey House once a bed is available for you. 
(R. 597-98.) 
On June 2, 1994, Maestas began his residency at Odyssey 
House. On June 24, 1994, the state filed a Progress/Violation 
Report asserting the following: 
[Maestas] had become suicidal, homicidal, and had begun 
attacking staff and personnel at Odyssey House. The 
defendant was rushed to the University of Utah Medical 
Center for medical assistance. The University of Utah staff 
indicated nothing could be done for the defendant. Odyssey 
House personnel has requested the defendant be removed 
immediately from the program. Due to the defendant's 
criminal history this agency is requesting a No-Bail Bench 
Warrant be issued to hold the defendant pending an Order to 
Show Cause Hearing. 
(R. 110.) The affidavit filed in support of the violation report 
stated simply that M[t]he defendant has failed to participate and 
comply to the conditions set forth by the Odyssey House program, 
which resulted in his removal from said program on June 23, 1994, 
in violation of condition number 11.5 of the defendant's Probation 
Agreement and the Court's order." (R. 117-18.) 
During the hearing on the matter, the state was required to 
provide sufficient evidence to support a willful violation of 
probation. State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 278 (Utah App. 1990). 
The prosecutor called two witnesses to testify: Tracy Anderson, the 
clinical director of the Odyssey House program, and Albert Nieto, 
a counselor for the program. The facts "viewed in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's findings" are set forth herein. 
State v. Archuleta, 812 P.2d 80, 82 (Utah App. 1991). 
Anderson testified that during the first stage of treatment in 
the program, residents are informed of the rules and tested over a 
25 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
thirty-day period to determine whether they can conform to those 
rules. (R. 614.) Anderson testified that in his opinion, Maestas 
had the ability to comply with the rules. (R. 621.) 
Shortly after Maestas began with the program, "some problems" 
arose. (R. 615.) Anderson described the situation as follows: 
He had difficulty with his impulse control. He got 
escalated on two or three occasions. We're set up to deal with 
sort of minor anger problems, but he got fairly escalated on 
one occasion and made some comments about - actually Albert, 
the other person who is here, knows that a little better. But 
at any rate, he said that he wanted to kill himself. 
On a couple of different occasions, we had to put him on 
what's called a suicide watch. We're not a psychiatric 
facility, and we're not set up 24 hours a day with doctors, so 
we have to provide a service basically, which is difficult to 
do, and that's watch the person 24 hours a day. At one point 
[Maestas] was also taken by Albert Nieto and another one of 
the clinicians up to the University of Utah Hospital Emergency 
Room because of the ideation that he had about hurting 
himself, running in the street, letting someone run over him. 
At one point I think he made a comment that if he got out 
he was going to assault his ex-wife. 
(R. 615-16.) Anderson testified that the Odyssey House program had 
very specific rules about "suicide ideation." "I personally spent 
time with Tony, and delineated to him that if the behavior 
continued that he will not be able to stay in the program. Two 
days later it was back and in force." (R. 616.) 
Anderson testified that he took Maestas' suicide threat "as 
real" and he considered the matter to be "a serious affair." (R. 
616.) Anderson informed Maestas "very clearly" that he "want[ed 
Maestas] to tell me if [he was] having the thoughts, but if the 
behavior and the thoughts continue and get out of hand we'll not be 
able to treat [Maestas] in this setting because we're not a 
psychiatric setting." (R. 618.) Anderson testified that the 
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Odyssey House program was not equipped to deal with such mental 
health issues. (R. 618-19.) 
Clearly, we're not a psychiatric facility. There are a number 
of hours during - there are hours in the facility in which 
there's not a professional doctor or clinician there. There 
are people on call. So if a person is suicidal or is 
gesturing, having difficulties that way, or if - well, in that 
respect, if that's occurring, they need to be watched by 
someone in the facility. And that's usually done by an upper 
level resident, meaning someone who's been in the facility 
quite some time, a level four. 
(R. 620.) The problems related only to the mental health issues (R. 
622-25) ; Maestas broke no other rules and was able to comply with 
the written/specific rules of the program. (R. 619; 621; 623-24.) 
Significantly, Anderson offered only the following testimony 
with respect to whether Maestas had "manipulated" the system or 
otherwise willfully failed to make a "bona fide" effort to comply 
with the Odyssey House rules: He stated that he considered the 
suicide threat to be "real" and that it was "a serious affair." 
(R. 616.) The fact that staff members transported Maestas to the 
University of Utah Medical Center emergency room further supports 
the seriousness and reality of the situation. 
With respect to Nieto's testimony, he described the situation 
as follows: 
We had had a graduation party for the graduates of the 
program, and on that day - where the location of the party was 
at a park on the west side of town. 
And according to Tony, his ex-wife lives across the 
street from the park, which he had gotten very emotional over 
it. Upon returning to the facility, he had trouble throughout 
the whole [day] that way. Upon returning to the facility he 
demanded to talk to me, and which we went into one of the 
offices, and had a discussion where he began to escalate. 
He didn't want to hear what was being said to him, in 
terms of just slowing down, and things can be taken care of, 
but we can't do nothing right now, per se. And at that point 
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it - another what we call all - group, where he has a peer 
present, I decided to turn it into a group situation rather 
than a one-on-one. Or actually, there was another counselor 
involved. 
I got Tony and one of his peers during that time to run 
a group with him and try to de-escalate the situation, and so 
that his peers could be aware of what was going on with Tony, 
and this could become a group issue. 
At that point during that: group is when the suicide 
ideation was made present by Tony. 
(R. 627-28.) According to Nieto, at that point Maestas was placed 
on suicide watch and eventually taken to the University of Utah 
Medical Center. (R. 628-29.) 
Nieto testified that after doctors examined Maestas and 
checked for ulcers, they discharged him. (R. 629.) Maestas was 
returned to the Odyssey House and the suicide threats continued. 
(R. 629-30.) Because the Odyssey House was not equipped to handle 
such problems, the staff determined the program could not serve 
Maestas. (R. 63 0.) The trial court continued Nieto's examination 
as follows: 
[COURT:] Did you perceive any of Mr. Maestas's acting out as 
being manipulative? 
[NIETO:] I would say that at first, I would say so, yes. As 
it continued, I would have to say no. 
[COURT:] And is that because after he initially began it he 
then found himself in such a frenzy? Would that be a fair 
statement? 
[NIETO:] You're - regarding his escalation and his - yes. Yes. 
(R. 632.) Nieto admitted that Maestas also had complained about 
ulcers, but that the staff had not checked into the medical 
problem. Subsequently, the staff learned that in fact Maestas 
suffered ulcers that apparently went untreated. (R. 629; 633-34.) 
With respect to whether Maestas willfully violated a rule, 
Nieto's testimony supports that he did not. Both witnesses 
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acknowledged that the program could handle some level of "suicidal 
ideation, " but that if it continued, the resident would not be 
allowed to participate in the program. (R. 618-20.) 
As the evidence reflects, Nieto believed that Maestas was not 
manipulative. (R. 632-33.) Simply, the Odyssey House program was 
not able to treat or monitor the mental health and medical issues 
presented by Maestas. 
Notwithstanding Nieto and Anderson's testimony on the matter, 
and the absence of any facts to support the determination that 
Maestas willfully violated Odyssey House rules, the trial judge 
found the following: 
The Court finds there has been a violation of the terms 
of the conditions of probation. That violation was knowing 
and intentional under circumstances where the defendant had 
the ability to comply with the Court's order on the conditions 
of probation. Therefore probation will be revoked. It will 
not be reinstated. There are only so many chances that the 
Court has the disposition or the opportunity to grant them in 
one case and deny them in another because there are only 
limited resources out there. We need to provide those 
resources to the people who have indicated they will take 
advantage of that. And that is not so in this case. 
(R. 653.) The trial court found a willful violation of the terms of 
probation. The trial court abused its discretion in making such a 
finding since the evidence is insufficient to support it. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) (Supp. 1994), 
probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court. This Court has ruled that such discretion may be exercised 
only in cases where defendant has willfully violated the conditions 
of his parole. Hodges, 798 P.2d at 277. 
In Hodges, defendant was placed on probation and ordered to 
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participate in and successfully complete the sex offender program 
at the Bonneville Community Correctional Center. Id. Eight months 
into the defendant's participation in the program, the staff 
concluded he was not making sufficient progress in treatment, and 
requested an order to show cause why probation should not be 
revoked. Id. 
State witnesses testified that defendant had "physical and 
mental problems that interfered with his ability to effectively 
participate in treatment." Id. at 272. In that case, one witness 
for the state testified that defendant's lack of improvement 
related to his "manipulative behavior." Id. Other than that, "no 
specific instances of undesirable behavior or non-compliance with 
Bonneville program rules were described." Id. The trial court 
revoked probation and this Court reversed and remanded the case for 
further findings regarding the matter. In reversing the case, the 
Court "address [ed] the question of what evidence may be sufficient 
to justify the modification or revocation of appellant's 
probation." Id. at 275. 
Specifically, this Court ruled that "in order to revoke 
probation, a violation of a probation condition must, as a 
general rule, be willful." Id. at 276. Where defendant's failure 
to progress in the program is beyond his control, probation 
cannot be revoked "unless it is also found that, because of this 
failure, appellant poses a present danger to others." Id. at 
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277.x A finding of willfulness "merely requires a finding that 
the probationer did not make bona fide efforts to meet the 
conditions of his probation." State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 
991 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting Archuleta, 812 P.2d at 84). 
In this matter, the evidence presented at the order to show 
cause proceeding was insufficient to support a willful violation. 
Instead, the evidence supported that Maestas made bona fide 
efforts to meet the conditions of his probation, but suffered 
medical and mental issues that were beyond his control and not 
treatable in the Odyssey House program. 
In other cases, this Court has found a "willful" violation 
under the following circumstances: In Peterson, 869 P.2d at 991-
92, defendant failed to obtain full-time employment. Rather, he 
started up his own business without authority, and only worked on 
and off as he wanted to. In addition, defendant failed to make 
bona fide efforts toward paying the fine associated with the 
punishment. Id. 
In Archuleta, 812 P.2d at 83, after defendant was ordered as 
a condition of probation to maintain full-time employment, he 
obtained employment at the Red Lion Hotel, then voluntarily quit 
his job when he was accused of stealing eyeglasses. The trial 
court determined the voluntary termination was willful, and the 
willful violation continued since there were jobs available in 
Salt Lake during the period of defendant's probation and 
1
 The trial court did not find that Maestas was a present 
danger to others. Thus, that is not an issue in this case. 
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defendant failed to secure a job. Id. 
In State v. Ruescra, 851 P.2d 1229, 1231-33 (Utah App. 1993), 
the defendant refused to sign the probation agreement that would 
initiate probation, "despite warning by the court." Id. 
Maestas' case is similar to Hodges, where the record 
reflects Maestas suffered medical and mental issues beyond his 
control. The issues were important enough to prompt the staff to 
transport Maestas to the hospital. The witnesses for the state 
testified that Maestas otherwise was capable of complying with 
the rules, and that Maestas was not manipulating the system. 
Because the issues were beyond Maestas' control, the program 
could not facilitate his needs. The alleged violation was not 
"willful." The trial court's finding to that effect is 
insupportable and clearly erroneous. 
Nothing in the record supports the determination that 
Maestas failed to make a bona fide effort to work within the 
parameters of the Odyssey House program. In accordance with the 
cases concerning probation revocation, the evidence was insuf-
ficient to support a willful violation. The trial court abused 
its discretion in terminating Maestas' probation. This case 
should be reversed on that basis. 
POINT III. THE ARREST IN THIS CASE VIOLATED UTAH LAW; 
CONSEQUENTLY, IT CANNOT SERVE TO SUPPORT THE SEARCH. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
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searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
The Utah counterpart is identical in relevant part to the federal 
provision and is given as much, if not more, force. Utah Const. 
Art. I, sec. 14; State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465-68 (Utah 
1990); accord State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1991) .2 
Unless officers have secured a valid warrant to search, 
under the federal and state constitutional provisions the search 
is per se unreasonable — "subject only to a few specifically 
established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. U.S., 389 
U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 
(1980) (warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively 
unreasonable); Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 571 (recognizing warrantless 
searches are per se unreasonable under art. I, sec. 14); State v. 
Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1290-91 (Utah App. 1988). 
Also, where officers fail to procure a warrant, "[t]he State 
carries the burden of showing that a warrantless search was 
lawful." Larocco, 794 P.2d at 470 (citations omitted); see also 
State v. James, 361 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 50 (Utah App. 1999) (the 
state carries the burden of establishing that the trooper's 
action was lawful); State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 13 (Utah App. 
2
 In determining whether the warrantless search was 
justified, the Fourth Amendment of the federal Constitution and 
Art. I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution are equally persuasive, and 
compel the determination that the evidence seized in this case 
must be suppressed. Maestas is not seeking a distinct analysis 
under Art. I, § 14 . 
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1993); State v. Ramirez, 814 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Utah App. 1991). 
In this matter, the trial court justified the warrantless 
search as "incident to arrest." (R. 285.) Because the state 
failed to establish that the arrest was lawful, the warrantless 
search cannot be upheld as set forth below. 
A. THE ARREST VIOLATED UTAH LAW. 
As set forth above, this matter involved an operation 
initiated by the DOC. Correctional officers determined to stop 
drug trafficking in the prison by focusing on persons outside the 
correctional facility who were suspected of supplying drugs to 
inmates. (R. 255-56; 358-59; 374.) Officials identified 
specific persons as the offending suppliers, and organized a drug 
purchase focusing on those persons in order to arrest them and to 
end the trafficking. (R. 239; 266-68; 284; 362-63; 385.) The 
correctional officers recruited Waldron to organize buys with 
identified suppliers during an undercover operation in March 
1992. (R. 255; 358-59; 374.) 
At some point during the undercover operation, it became 
apparent to correctional officers that identified suppliers were 
not available, and/or were not able to provide drugs. (R. 234; 
239; 361-62.) Thus, the operation diverted, and officials allowed 
Waldron to arrange a purchase from Maestas. Nothing in the record 
supports that Maestas was an intended target of the operation. In 
fact, correctional officers admitted the operation "had nothing 
to do with Maestas" (R. 239; see also 266-68; 362-63; 385), and 
the trial judge found that Maestas' involvement in the matter was 
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"an accidental happening." (R. 284.) Thus, at the time that 
correctional officers diverted from their intended operation, 
they were acting outside the scope of their authority under Utah 
law. 
Utah statutory law in effect in 1992 governed the DOC and 
its operations outside correctional facilities. Section 64-13-6 
recognized that the "primary purposes" of the DOC were to protect 
the public by caring for and confining offenders; implementing 
court-ordered punishment for offenders; providing programs to 
assist offenders; managing programs to take into account "the 
needs and interests of victims, where reasonable"; and 
supervising probationers and parolees. Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-6 
(Supp. 1992) .3 An "offender" was defined as a person who had been 
convicted of a crime for which he may be committed to the custody 
of the DOC. Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-1(8) (Supp. 1992).4 
3
 In 1993, that provision was amended to include the 
following additional duties: "the department shall:" "investigate 
criminal conduct involving offenders incarcerated in a state 
correctional facility;" and "cooperate and exchange information 
with other state, local, and federal law enforcement agencies to 
achieve greater success in prevention and detection of crime and 
apprehension of criminals." 
4
 In 1993, the statutes were amended to include an 
additional, substantive statute, identified as Section 64-13-
21.5. It states the following: 
(1) Employees of the department who are designated by the 
executive director as correctional officers may exercise the 
powers and authority of a peace officer only when needed to 
properly carry out the following functions: 
(a) performing the officer's duties within the boundaries of 
a correctional facility; 
(b) supervising an offender during transportation; 
(c) when in fresh pursuit of an offender who has escaped 
(continued...) 
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The "duties" of the DOC were specifically limited to 
management of adjudicated offenders and the operation of 
correctional facilities as follows: "The department shall provide 
probation supervision programs, parole supervision programs, 
correctional facilities, community correctional centers, and 
other programs or facilities as necessary and as required to 
accomplish its purposes." Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-10 (Supp. 
1992) . 
Utah Code Ann.. § 64-13-12 also allowed the DOC to assist 
county sheriffs "in the development of jail standards, in the 
review of jail facilities," and in providing "other services as 
requested by the sheriffs." Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-12 (Supp. 
1992) . 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-la-l and 77-la-2 specified that a 
"corrections officer" only had "peace officer authority" while 
(...continued) 
from the custody of the department; or 
(d) when requested to assist a local, state or federal law 
enforcement agency. 
(2) Employees of the department who are POST certified and 
who are designated as correctional enforcement or 
investigation officers are peace officers and may have the 
following duties, as specified by the executive director: 
(a) providing investigative services for the department; 
(b) conducting criminal investigations and operations in 
cooperation with state, local, and federal law enforcement 
agencies; and 
(c) providing security and enforcement for the department. 
Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-21.5 (1993). Utah statutory law 
specifically provides that unless newly enacted legislation 
specifies that it shall be applied retroactively, such 
legislation may be applied only prospectively. Utah Code Ann. § 
68-3-3 (1996). Since Section 64-13-21.5 was not in effect at the 
time of the alleged, offense in this case, it does not apply in 
this matter. 
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engaged in the performance of his duties. Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-
la-1 (Supp. 1992) and 77-la-2 (1990). 
The Utah Legislature amended Utah law governing the duties 
of the DOC in 1993. See notes 3, and 4, herein. Because the 
events giving rise to the matter in this case occurred in 1992, 
the law in effect at that time is applicable to this Court's 
analysis. See State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1987) .5 
In 1992, Utah statutory law did not authorize correctional 
officers to conduct criminal investigations or operations outside 
correctional facilities. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 64-13-1, et. seq. 
(1986 & Supp. 1992); see also Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1368 (statutory 
sections encompass the total spectrum of a police officer's acts 
and authority). By engaging in such an operation, the 
correctional officers in this case acted outside the scope of 
their authority in violation of the law. Fixel supports such a 
determination. 
In Fixel, a Provo City police officer arranged and 
participated in a drug transactions in Pleasant Grove, Utah. 
When the transaction was completed, "[a]n arrest warrant was 
5
 In Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1366, the Utah Supreme Court 
considered whether an officer acted beyond the scope of his 
authority under Utah statutory law, where the officer conducted 
an undercover drug transaction outside his jurisdiction. The 
Court applied the statutes in effect at the time of the 
transaction, and noted that statutory amendments to the 
provisions became effective one month thereafter. Id. The court 
did not consider the effect of the later amendments. 
As in Fixel, the statutes in effect at the time of the DOC 
undercover operation in this case must be considered to determine 
if officers acted outside the scope of their statutory authority 
in arresting Maestas. 
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later issued, and defendant was arrested and charged twice for 
distributing a controlled substance for value." Id. at 1367. 
Defendant argued that because the officer involved in the 
transaction was outside his jurisdictional limits at the time of 
the purchase, he acted beyond the scope of his authority. Id. 
The state countered defendant's argument by asserting that the 
statutes governing peace officer conduct did not apply because 
the officer "acted as a private citizen when he participated in 
the drug transactions." The Utah Supreme Court was "not 
persuaded." Id. at 1368. — 
The court recognized that Utah statutory law encompassed 
"the total spectrum of a police officer's acts and authority." 
Id. In that regard, 
[Officer] Guinn was discharging the functions of his office, 
and in doing so, his activities involved the exercise of his 
official duties and authority. Indeed, the record indicates 
that Guinn was on duty during the time he participated in at 
least the first drug transaction. Moreover, Guinn himself 
testified that on both occasions, he was operating in his 
official capacity as an undercover police officer assigned 
to investigate narcotics offenses. As such, he was 
conducting an authorized official investigation. He filed 
reports and apparently advised his supervisor of the two 
transactions. He also delivered the contraband to a superior 
at regularly scheduled meetings. 
In light of the above, we cannot sanction the State's 
approach of avoiding the intended statutory proscriptions by 
conveniently classifying Guinn's investigation as that of a 
private citizen without the mantle of police authority. We 
conclude, therefore, that Guinn clearly acted outside the 
scope of his statutory authority when he conducted the 
investigations in Pleasant Grove. 
1 
Id. Pursuant to Fixel and the Utah statutory law in effect at 
the time of the undercover operation in Maestas' case, the 
correctional officers were acting outside the scope of their 
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statutory authority at the time of Maestas' arrest. The 
warrantless arrest was invalid since the officers lacked 
authority to participate in the operation and/or to make the 
arrest. The search cannot be upheld as incident to the illegal 
arrest. 
B. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IS APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. 
Since the warrantless, unlawful arrest served as the basis 
for justifying the warrantless search, the exclusionary rule is 
appropriate as a remedy. Maestas has raised this issue on appeal 
as a Fourth Amendment violation, and he specifically is 
challenging the validity of the arrest as the basis for the 
search. Thus, suppression of the evidence confiscated in 
connection with the warrantless search is appropriate. 
Suppression is automatic in the search-and-seizure context 
since the "prime purpose" of the exclusionary rule "is to deter 
future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the 
guarantee of the 4th Amendment against unreasonable searches and 
seizures." Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974)(quoting 
U.S. v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)). The exclusionary 
rule applies when police have engaged in willful or negligent, 
unlawful conduct. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447. Such conduct existed 
here. 
In Fixel, since the defendant did not claim that the officer 
violated a constitutional right, or that the arrest was invalid, 
the Utah Supreme Court was unwilling to automatically apply the 
exclusionary rule as an appropriate remedy. "Defendant does not 
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argue or show that the later arrest failed to satisfy section 77-
9-3 or that it was otherwise unlawful. His claim is limited to 
the officer's conduct in making the drug buys. We reject any 
suggestion that the buys in this case were the equivalent of an 
official search by the police." Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1369 n. 10. 
Although the court did not apply the exclusionary rule in 
Fixel, it ruled that suppression of the evidence would serve as a 
remedy for a statutory violation under the following 
circumstances. 
Only a "fundamental" violation of [a rule of criminal 
procedure] requires automatic suppression, and a violation 
is "fundamental" only where it, in effect, renders the 
search unconstitutional under traditional fourth amendment 
standards. Where the alleged violation ... is not 
"fundamental" suppression is required only where: 
(1) there was "prejudice" in the sense that the search might 
not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the 
[r]ule had been followed, or 
(2) there is evidence of intentional and deliberate 
disregard of a provision of the[r]ule... 
... It is only where the violation also implicates 
fundamental, constitutional concerns, is conducted in bad-
faith or has substantially prejudiced the defendant that 
exclusion may be an appropriate remedy. 
Id. at 1368-69 (alterations in original; notes omitted) (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Mason, 490 A.2d 421 (Pa. 1985)). This Court has 
identified the above analysis as the ""persuasive' standard." 
State v. Ribe, 876 P.2d 403, 410 (Utah App. 1994). 
Again, Maestas maintains that the exclusionary rule 
automatically applies in this case since the unlawful arrest 
served as the basis for justifying the warrantless search. Thus, 
the analysis under the "persuasive standard" in Fixel is not 
relevant. To the extent this Court determines the Fixel, 
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persuasive-standard analysis applies, the evidence in this case 
should have been suppressed for at least two reasons. 
First, "the search might not have occurred" if the statutes 
had been followed. Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1368-69. Since statutory 
law did not permit officers to engage in the undercover operation 
outside the correctional facility, if officers had followed the 
law, the undercover operation would not have occurred, and 
Maestas never would have been searched. 
To the extent such an operation by the DOC was permissible 
for the purpose of ending drug trafficking in the prison, the 
officers exceeded the scope of their authority when they involved 
Maestas in the transaction, since he was not a targeted supplier. 
That is, since Maestas was not a target of the operation, but was 
an "accidental happening" (R. 284), correctional officers either 
should have terminated the operation when it diverted from its 
intended purpose, or obtained the cooperation of the local law 
enforcement. There is no evidence that any local law agency was 
involved in or aware of, or would have approved the undercover 
operation. Thus, again, the search would not have occurred if 
officers had followed the law. 
In other cases concerning application of the "persuasive 
standard," Utah appellate courts have been unwilling to find that 
under the circumstances, "the search might not have occurred." 
Those cases are distinguishable as follows. 
In State v. Rowe, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme 
Court ruled that under the Fixel "persuasive standard," 
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suppression was not an appropriate remedy in that case for 
violations of the statute authorizing nighttime searches. In 
that case, the magistrate issued a warrant to search a third-
person's apartment. The warrant was supported by an affidavit 
that failed to contain sufficient evidence to support the 
nighttime search provision. Id. at 428-29. The magistrate also 
issued a proper arrest warrant that permitted entry into the 
apartment during nighttime hours to arrest the third person. 
11
 [0] nly the timing of the actual search of the apartment was 
improperly authorized." Id. at 430. 
In considering the "persuasive standard" and whether the 
search otherwise would have occurred if the rule had been 
followed, the Utah Supreme Court stated the following: 
In order to show prejudice, defendant must establish that 
absent the nighttime entry, "the search would not otherwise 
have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the Rule 
had been followed." Defendant has shown no such prejudice. 
Even without the erroneous inclusion of nighttime search 
authority, the officers had authority to enter [the third-
person's apartment] during nighttime hours pursuant to a 
valid arrest warrant. The magistrate's erroneous approval 
of nighttime search authority for [the third-person's home] 
was harmless, as the officers could have rightfully taken 
steps to secure the house pursuant to the arrest warrant, to 
ask defendant to leave the house, and to search the house in 
the daylight hours. The erroneous issuance of the warrant 
did not therefore prejudice defendant, whose property would 
have been searched regardless of the time of the warrant's 
execution. 
Rowe, 850 P.2d at 430 (footnotes omitted). "The holding in 
Rowe [] turned on the fact that the officers possessed a daytime i 
search warrant, and a day or nighttime arrest warrant. In short, 
the officers essentially were authorized to enter the dwelling at 
any time to arrest an occupant and to secure the premises." \ 
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State v. Simmons, 866 P.2d 614, 618 (Utah App. 1993). Thus, the 
defendant in Rowe could not show prejudice under Fixel. 
In Simmons, defendants argued that the warrant failed to 
comply with statutory requirements authorizing nighttime 
searches, but that the warrant otherwise was valid. Because the 
defendants did not assert that the search would not have occurred 
if officers had complied with the law, this Court ruled that the 
defendants failed to show prejudice. Id. at 618. 
In State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988), defendant argued 
the search was unlawful because the officers failed to knock and 
announce their presence in executing the otherwise appropriate 
search warrant. According to the defendant, such conduct 
violated Utah statutory law concerning the execution of a search 
warrant, and the violation required suppression of the evidence 
obtained in connection with the search. The Utah Supreme Court 
determined the officers violated the statute, but refused to 
suppress the evidence under an analysis similar to the 
"persuasive standard"; the court found that the search would have 
occurred even if officers had executed the warrant in accordance 
with Utah statutory law: 
Here, there was no claim that either the fact of entry or 
the search and seizure was otherwise unlawful. The claim is 
only that the manner of entry was unlawful. However, the 
manner of entry in this case had nothing to do with the 
extent of the intrusion on defendant's privacy. The officers 
had a search warrant and executed it on the same day it was 
obtained. Although their unannounced entry was not 
authorized by the warrant, it did not contribute appreciably 
to the invasion of privacy already authorized by the 
warrant. Furthermore, the officers made a proper 
announcement and gave proper notice when Buck arrived on the 
scene. Under the circumstances, the officers' conduct was 
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not unreasonable, and the trial court did not err in 
refusing to suppress the evidence seized. 
Id. at 703 (cites and footnotes omitted). 
In Maestas' case, if officers had complied with Utah 
statutory law, the search never would have occurred. The 
officers did not otherwise have statutory or other authority to 
proceed with the undercover operation involving Maestas. Under 
Utah law, officers should have terminated the operation before it 
exceeded statutory limits. Compliance with Utah law would have 
terminated the operation before Maestas' involvement in the 
matter. Under the analysis in Pixel, Maestas has shown that the 
search would not have occurred if the law had been followed. See 
Fixel. 744 P.2d at 1368. 
Second, "there is evidence of intentional and deliberate 
disregard of a provision of the rule." Id. at 1368-69. The 
evidence supports that prior to Waldron's alleged transaction 
with Maestas, officers knew that Waldron was having difficulties 
arranging a purchase from targeted suppliers, and they knew that 
Maestas was not a target of the operation. (See R. 239.) The 
officers' knowledge and continued involvement in the operation 
without advising local law enforcement agencies supports an 
intentional and deliberate disregaird for the statutory law. Since 
the arrest was unlawful in this case and the evidence supports 
application of the exclusionary rule, the evidence obtained i 
during the warrantless search should have been suppressed. 
C. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ISSUE WAS PROPERLY PRESERVED FOR 
APPEAL. 
44 
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The defense in this case raised the issue of the legality of 
the arrest in the trial court prior to re-sentencing. (Case No. 
950902479 at 160-62.) The trial court specifically refused to 
address the matter, and ordered Maestas to raise the issue on 
appeal for a determination by this Court. (See R. 677-78; 686-88; 
690; 718; 730; 734-35.) Inasmuch as Maestas raised the issue in 
the trial court, it is properly preserved. The trial court erred 
in failing to address the matter. 
In the event this Court determines that the issue was not 
properly preserved for purposes of appeal, Maestas asserts 
ineffective assistance of counsel and plain error. This Court 
may reach the merits of the warrantless search under those 
doctrines. 
1• The Trial Court Committed Plain Error in Failing to 
Suppress Evidence Confiscated in Connection with the 
Warrantless Search. 
The plain-error doctrine considers whether the trial court 
failed to comply with the plain requirements of the law. 
In general, to establish the existence of plain error and to 
obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was not 
properly objected to, the appellant must show the following: 
(i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, 
i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of 
a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased 
differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined.[] 
See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 105-06 (Utah 1988); State v. Knight, 
734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987); State v. Fontana, 680 
P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984); see also fState v. Eldredge, 
773 P.2d 29, 35-36 (Utah 1989)]; cf_^  Utah R. Evid. 103(d); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c). If any one of these requirements is 
not met, plain error is not established. Cf. State v. Hamil-
ton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992); Verde, 770 P.2d at 123. 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). In this case, 
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the trial court committed plain error in failing to suppress the 
evidence where the arrest was unlawful. 
First, for the reasons set forth above, Point III.A., an 
error existed. Utah statutory provisions and case law plainly 
provide that an officer engaged in an undercover operation 
outside his jurisdiction is acting outside the scope of his 
authority. Since the officers here were acting outside the scope 
of their authority, the warrantless arrest was unlawful. The 
unlawful arrest invalidates the warrantless search. 
Second, the error was obvious. The plain statutory law and 
Pixel, reflect that officers in this matter acted beyond the 
scope of their authority in involving Maestas in the undercover 
operation. In addition, the trial judge in this case sat through 
the evidentiary hearing concerning suppression of the evidence. 
The judge asked the officers particular questions going to the 
statutory "scope-of-authority," and concerning Maestas' involve-
ment in the matter. Specifically, the judge asked the following: 
[COURT] : Who was the targ€>t or targets of your 
investigation? 
[OFFICER LUCEY]: The original targets were involved within 
the facility who'd been using this informant to mule 
narcotics into the facility. 
[COURT]: And by "facility," you're talking about the 
corrections facility? 
[LUCEY]: Utah State Prison, yes. And their agents on the 
street. 
* * * 
[COURT]: What was the Department of Corrections doing 
involved in this [operation]? i 
[OFFICER ALLEN]: My understanding, the [confidential 
informant] had agreed to purchase cocaine and other 
narcotics from several individuals that day. He was 
released from the prison and was being monitored by the 
Department of Corrections to make these purchases. 
[COURT]: Well, did you have any information which indicated ( 
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that any of the purported or proposed sellers knew that they 
were selling to an inmate of the prison, and therefore the 
drugs would likely end up in the prison? 
[ALLEN]: I [knew] earlier there [were] a couple of 
conversations with the individual that day, talking about 
that he was from the prison. One of the individuals that we 
talked to earlier that day had talked about how they get it 
back in the prison. But I -
[COURT]: Did you hear anything over this wire that indicated 
anything to you from this transaction, in which it's claimed 
Mr. Maestas sold drugs to the informant, that indicated Mr. 
Maestas knew that the confidential informant was an inmate 
at the prison or that the drugs would likely end up in the 
prison? 
[ALLEN]: I don't think there was any conversation that they 
would likely end up in the prison. I think that there was a 
conversation that he was an inmate on work release. 
(R. 255-56; 266-68.) 
The examination reflects that the judge was aware that by 
involving Maestas in the operation, the officers were acting 
outside the scope of authority, rendering their involvement in 
the operation and the arrest invalid. Indeed, the judge 
specifically made a finding to that effect when he ruled that 
Maestas' involvement in the undercover operation was an 
"accidental happening." (R. 284.) Further, at the conclusion of 
the motion to suppress hearing, the judge expressed an interest 
in resolving this issue, but did not intend to make it part of 
the record. The judge stated the following to the prosecutor: 
"... [C]an I speak to you generally in my office about the 
Department of Corrections and the manner in which they go about 
these things?" (R. 287.) The record reflects that the judge was 
aware of the jurisdictional problems presented by the officers' 
involvement of Maestas in the undercover operation. 
With respect to the third prong of the plain-error analysis, 
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in this case, the error was harmful since suppression of the 
evidence would have substantially weakened the state's case. The 
state would have been prevented from offering evidence concerning 
the items confiscated in connection with the warrantless search, 
and suppression would have rendered Sundquist's testimony 
inadmissible. The state would be left without any evidence to 
support the possession charge, and little evidence to support 
distribution. Thus, this Court may conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that if the evidence had been suppressed, there would have 
been a very different result in this case. The error was harmful. 
2. Trial Counsel Was Ineffective for Failing to Seek 
Suppression of the Evidence on the Basis that the Arrest Was 
Invalid. 
As set forth above, Maestas was entitled to the effective 
assistance of counsel. See Point I.A., supra. Trial counsel 
failed to seek suppression during pre-trial proceedings of the 
evidence on the basis that the arrest was unlawful since the 
officers were acting outside the scope of their authority. The 
argument was obvious under Utah statutory and case law. See Point 
III.C.l. Because trial counsel failed to seek suppression of the 
evidence on that basis, Maestas commenced a 65B proceeding 
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel (Case No. 950902479), 
and he has been forced in this matter to argue plain error on 
appeal. Trial counsel's failure to argue the matter was 
deficient. 
The record fails to support any possible tactical reason for 
failing to raise the matter. "[W]here a defendant can show that 
i 
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there was no conceivable legitimate tactical basis for counsel's 
deficient actions, the first prong of Strickland is satisfied." 
State v. Snvder, 860 P.2d 351, 359 (Utah App. 1993) (citing State 
v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah App. 1993)). Trial counsel 
could have requested suppression of the evidence at any time 
prior to or during trial, on the basis that the arrest was 
unlawful, thereby invalidating the search. 
Because trial counsel failed to properly raise the matter, 
Maestas has been prejudiced. He was prejudiced because the il-
legally obtained evidence was presented to the jury. Even if the 
trial court had improperly denied the suppression motion, Maestas 
is prejudiced by the heightened requirement that he show plain 
error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. This Court should 
address the suppression issue de novo to alleviate the prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Maestas respectfully 
requests reversal of the convictions in this matter, and remand 
for further proceedings, as this Court may deem appropriate. 
SUBMITTED this 3L2~U. day of ^ U U A ^ , 1999. 
LINDA \ M. JONES nL 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant 
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CHAPTER 13 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS — 
STATE PRISON 
Sunset Act — Section 63-55-264 provides that Chapters 13 and 13a, the Department of Cor-
rections, are repealed July 1, 1993. 
Section 
64-13-1. Definitions. 
64-13-2. Creation of department. 
64-13-3. Executive director. 
64-13-6. Purposes of department. 
64-13-7. Offenders in custody of depart-
ment. 
64-13-7.5. Persons in need of mental 
health services — Contracts. 
64-13-8. Designation of employee 
powers. 
64-13-9. Repealed. 
64-13-10. Department duties. 
64-13-12. Assistance to sheriffs. 
64-13-13. Administrators. 
64-13-14. Secure correctional facilities. 
64-13-14.5. Limits of confinement place — 
Release status — Work re-
lease. 
64-13-14.7. Victim notification of offender's 
release. 
64-13-15. Property of offender — Storage 
and disposal. 
64-13-16. Inmate employment. 
64-13-17. Visitors to correctional facili-
ties — Correspondence. 
64-13-19. Labor at correctional facilities. 
64-13-20. Investigative services — Pre-
Section 
64-13-21. 
64-13-22. 
64-13-23. 
64-13-24. 
64-13-25. 
64-13-26. 
64-13-27. 
64-13-28. 
64-13-29. 
64-13-30. 
64-13-31. 
64-13-32. 
64-13-34. 
64-13-35. 
64-13-36. 
sentence investigations and 
diagnostic evaluations. 
Supervision of sentenced of-
fenders placed in community. 
Repealed. 
Offender's income and finances. 
Standards for staff training. 
Standards for programs. 
Private providers of services. 
Records — Access. 
Hearings involving staff or of-
fenders. 
Violation of parole or probation 
— Detention — Hearing. 
Expenses incurred by offenders 
— Payment to department. 
Emergencies. 
Discipline of offenders — Use of 
force. 
Safety of offenders. 
Items prohibited in correctional 
facilities — Penalties. 
Testing of prisoners for AIDS 
and HTV infection — Segre-
gation — Medical care — De-
partment authority. 
-13-L D finitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Community correctional center" means a nonsecure correctional 
facility operated by the department. 
(2) "Correctional facility" means any facility operated by the depart-
ment to house offenders, either in a secure or nonsecure setting. 
(3) "Council" means the Corrections Advisory Council. 
(4) "Department" means the Department of Corrections. 
(5) "Emergency" means any riot, disturbance, homicide, inmate vio-
lence occurring in any correctional facility, or any situation that presents 
immediate danger to the safety, security, and control of the department. 
(6) "Executive director" means the executive director of the Depart-
ment of Corrections. 
(7) "Inmate" means any person who is committed to the custody of the 
department and who is housed at a correctional facility or at a county jail 
at the request of the department. 
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(8) "Offender" means any person who has been convicted of a crime for 
which he may be committed to the custody of the department and is at 
least one of the following: 
(a) committed to the custody of the department; 
(b) on probation; or 
(c) on parole. 
(9) "Secure correctional facility" means any prison, penitentiary, or 
other institution operated by the department or under contract for the 
confinement of offenders, where force may be used to restrain them if they 
attempt to leave the institution without authorization. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-1, enacted by L. tions (1) and (2) as present Subsections (4) and 
1985, ch. 198, § 1; 1987, ch. 116, § 1; 1989, (5). 
ch. 224, § 1. The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- 1989, added present Subsection (5) and redes-
ment added present Subsections (1), (2) and (6) ignated former Subsections (5) to (8) as Subsec-
through (8), and redesignated former Subsec- tions (6) to (9). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — State prisoner's right to personally feet of Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons 
appear at civil trial to which he is a party— Act, 42 USCS §§ 1997-1997J, 93 A.L.R. Fed. 
state court cases, 82 A.L.R.4th 1063. 706. 
Validity, construction, application, and ef-
64-13-2. Creation of department. 
There is created a Department of Corrections, under the general supervi-
sion of the executive director of the department. The department is the state 
authority for corrections and assumes all powers and responsibilities formerly 
vested in the Board of Corrections and the Division of Corrections in the 
Department of Human Services. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-2, enacted by L. ment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted 
1985, ch. 198, § 2; 1990, ch. 183, § 47. "Human Services" for "Social Services" at the 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- end of the second sentence. 
64-13-3. Executive director. 
(1) The executive director shall be appointed by the governor with the ad-
vice and consent; of the Senate. 
(2) The executive director shall be experienced and knowledgeable in the 
field of corrections and shall have training in criminology and penology. 
(3) The governor shall establish the executive director's salary within the 
salary range fixed by the Legislature in Title 67, Chapter 22, State Officer 
Compensation. { 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-3, enacted by L. ment, effective July 1, 1991, added Subsection 
1986, ch. 198, § 3; 1991, ch. 114, § 20. (3). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
( 
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64-13-4. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 64-13-4 (L. 1977, ch. diem and expense allowances of board mem-
253, § 4), relating to the oath, bond and per bers, was repealed by Laws 1979, ch. 102, § 17. 
64-13-4.1. Creation of Corrections Advisory Council. 
(1) There is created within the Department of Corrections a Corrections 
Advisory Council consisting of seven members. Each member shall be ap-
pointed by the governor for a term of four years, with the advice and consent 
of the Senate. Terms of the council members shall be staggered, with no more 
than two terms expiring in any one year. Each council member shall be a 
resident of the state. No more than four members may be from the same 
political party and no member may hold any office connected with the Depart-
ment of Corrections. A vacancy occurring on the council for any reason shall 
be filled by the governor with the advice and consent of the Senate for the 
unexpired term of the vacated member. 
(2) Membership of the council should be chosen to reflect: 
(a) geographical distribution; 
(b) expertise or personal experience with subject matters in the field of 
corrections; 
(c) diversity of opinion and political preference; and 
(d) gender, cultural, and ethnic diversity. 
(3) Council members may be appointed for no more than two consecutive 
terms unless the governor deems an additional term is in the best interest of 
the state. 
(4) Council members serve in a part-time capacity and without salary, but 
members shall receive a per diem allowance established by the director of the 
Division of Finance and all actual and necessary expenses incurred in the 
performance of official duties. 
(5) A member of the council may not hold any other office in the govern-
ment of the United States or of this state or of any municipal corporation 
within the state. 
(6) Any member may be removed at any time by the governor for official 
misconduct, habitual or wilful neglect of duty, or for other good and sufficient 
cause. 
(7) A council member shall disclose any conflict of interest to the council 
and if the conflict involves a direct or financial interest in either the subject 
under consideration or an entity or asset that could be substantially affected 
by the outcome of council action, the member shall refrain from voting on the 
matter. 
(8) Current members of the Board of Corrections shall continue in office as 
members of the Corrections Advisory Council until expiration of their terms 
and until their successors are chosen. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-4.1, enacted by L. Per diem rates and travel expenses, 
1985, ch. 198, § 4. §§ 63-1-14.5, 63-1-15. 
Cross-References. — Governor's appoint-
ive power, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 10. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 72 C.J.S. Prisons § 5. 
Key Numbers. — Prisons *=» 4. 
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64-13-5. Council duties. 
(1) The Corrections Advisory Council shall review and make recommenda-
tions to the executive director of the Department of Corrections concerning: 
(a) the role and responsibility of the department and its programs; 
(b) existing and proposed policies of the department; 
(c) the annual budget request for the department prior to submission to 
the governor; 
(d) development and implementation of master plans for the depart-
ment's programs and facilities, including facility siting; 
(e) any subject deemed appropriate by the council, except the council 
may not become involved in administrative matters; and 
(f) any subject concerning the department, as requested by the execu-
tive director. 
(2) The council shall encourage citizen awareness and input regarding pro-
grams in the field of corrections. 
(3) The council shall prepare an annual report for the governor and the 
Legislature on the status of the department and its programs. 
(4) The director of the department shall provide staff assistance and any 
information necessary for the Corrections Advisory Council to fulfill its re-
sponsibilities under this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-5, enacted by I* enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, § 5, creating 
1985, ch. 198, § 5. division of corrections, and enacts the above 
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985, section, 
ch. 198, § 5 repeals former § 64-13-5, as 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 72 CJ.S. Prisons § 5. 
Key Numbers. — Prisons *=» 4. 
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64-13-6. Purposes of department 
The primary purposes of the Department of Corrections include: 
(1) protection of the public through institutional care and confinement, 
and supervision in the community of offenders where appropriate; 
(2) implementation of court-ordered punishment of offenders; 
(3) provision of program opportunities for offenders; 
(4) management of programs to take into account the needs and inter-
ests of victims, where reasonable; and 
(5) supervision of probationers and parolees as directed by statute and 
implemented by the courts and Board of Pardons. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-6, enacted by L. habitation" and "for offenders" for "to assist 
1985, ch. 211, § 1; 1987, ch. 116, § 2. the criminal offender in functioning as a law-
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- abiding and productive member of society" in 
ment substituted "purposes" for "purpose" and Subsection (3); deleted former Subsection (4), 
"include" for "includes the following" in the in- which read "individualized treatment of the of-
troductory language; inserted "of offenders" in fender, and"; redesignated former Subsection 
Subsection (1); substituted "offenders" for "the (5) as present Subsection (4); made punctua-
criminal offender for the purpose of maintain- tion changes and added "and" to the end, in 
ing a law-abiding and productive society" in Subsection (4); and added present Subsection 
Subsection (2); substituted "program" for "re- (5). 
64-13-7. Offenders in custody of department* 
All offenders committed for incarceration in a state correctional facility, for 
supervision on probation or parole, or for evaluation, shall be placed in the 
custody of the department. The department shall establish procedures and is 
responsible for the appropriate assignment or transfer of public offenders to 
facilities or programs. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-7, enacted by L. ment substituted "correctional" for "prison" in 
1985, ch. 211, § 2; 1987, ch. 116, § 3. the first sentence. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
64-13-7.5. Persons in need of mental health services — 
Contracts. 
(1) Except as provided for in Subsection (2), when the department deter-
mines that a person in its custody is in need of mental health services, the 
department shall contract with the Division of Mental Health, local mental 
health authorities, or the state hospital to provide mental health services for 
that person. Those services may be provided at the Utah State Hospital or in 
community programs provided by or under contract with the Division of Men-
tal Health, a local mental health authority, or other public or private mental 
health care providers. 
(2) If the Division of Mental Health, a local mental health authority, or the 
state hospital notifies the department that it is unable to provide mental 
health services under Subsection (1), the department may contract with other 
public or private mental health care providers to provide mental health ser-
vices for persons in its custody. 
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History: C. 1953, 64-13-7.5, enacted by L. partment has determined to be" and made a 
1989, ch. 245, § 5; 1991, ch. 193, § 1. stylistic change in the first sentence in Subsec-
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- tion (1); and inserted "or other public or pri-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, added the Sub-
 Vate mental health care providers" and made 
section (1) designation and added Subsection ^ 1 ^ changes in the second sentence in Sub-
(2); substituted TSxcept as provided for in Sub- section (1) 
section (2), when the department.determines Effective Dates. - Laws 1989, ch. 245, § 8 
that a person in its custody is for For persons
 m a k e s t h e ^ e f f e c t i v e Qn J u ] x 1 9 g 9 
in the custody of the department who the de-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Right of state prison authorities to to prisoner without his or her consent—state 
administer neuroleptic or antipsychotic drugs cases, 75 A.L.R4th 1124. 
64-13-8. Designation of employee powers. 
The department shall designate by policy which of its employees have the 
authority and powers of peace officers, the power to administer oaths, and 
other powers the department considers appropriate, including but not limited 
to the responsibility to bear firearms. 
History: C. 1963, 64-13-8, enacted by L. substituted "its" for "those" and "considers" for 
1985, ch. 211, § 3; 1987, ch. 116, § 4. "deems" and inserted "authority and" in the 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- remaining sentence, 
ment deleted the former first sentence; and 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Probation officer's liability for 
negligent supervision of probationer, 44 
A.L.R.4th 638. 
64-13-9. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1987, ch. 116, § 28 repeals § 4, relating to department services to other 
§ 64-13-9, as enacted by Laws 1985, ch. 211, agencies, effective April 27, 1987. 
64-13-10. Department duties. 
The department shall provide probation supervision programs, parole su-
pervision programs, correctional facilities, community correctional centers, 
and other programs or facilities as necessary and as required to accomplish its 
purposes. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-10, enacted by L. and "necessary and as required to accomplish 
1985, ch. 211, § 5; 1987, ch. 116, § 5. its purposes" for "required for the safe manage-
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- ment of public offenders." 
ment substituted "correctional" for "prison" 
( 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AX.R. — Constitutional right of prisoners 
to abortion services and facilities — federal 
cases, 90 A.L.R. Fed. 683. 
64-13-10.5, 64-13-11. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1992, ch. 90, § 2 repeals 
§ 64-13-10.5, as enacted by L. 1987, ch. 157, 
§ 2, relating to education of persons in custody 
of Department of Corrections, contracting for 
services, transfer of supplies, equipment, furni-
ture, and budget, and joint committee, effective 
April 27, 1992. For present comparable provi-
sions, see § 53A-1-403.5. 
Laws 1987, ch. 116, § 28 repeals § 64-13-11, 
as enacted by Laws 1985, ch. 211, § 6, relating 
to evaluation programs, effective April 27, 
1987. 
64-13-12. Assistance to sheriffs. 
Where resources permit, the department may assist county sheriffs in the 
development of jail standards, in the review of jail facilities, and shall provide 
other services as requested by the sheriffs. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-12, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 211, § 7; 1987, ch. 116, § 6; 1988, 
ch. 100, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment divided the section into subsections; 
added "Where resources permit" to the begin-
ning of Subsection (1), substituted "may assist" 
for "shall assist" and "in the review of jail facil-
ities, and shall provide" for "review of facili-
ties, and" and deleted "where available re-
sources permit" following "by the sheriffs" in 
Subsection (1); and substituted "or for "for" 
preceding "an offender" in Subsection (2)(a). 
The 1988 amendment, effective July 1, 1990, 
deleted former Subsection (2), pertaining to re-
imbursement of a county for the incarceration 
of a felon, and deleted the Subsection (1) desig-
nation from the remaining paragraph. 
64-13-13. Administrators. 
The executive director shall appoint deputy directors, wardens, regional 
administrators, and other administrators as necessary to administer correc-
tional programs. Deputy directors, wardens, and regional administrators shall 
have experience in corrections, related criminal justice fields, law, or crimi-
nology, and experience in administration. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-13, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 211, § 8; 1987, ch. 116, § 7. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment inserted "wardens, regional administra-
tors, and other administrators" and made a 
punctuation change in the first sentence and 
deleted the former second sentence, authoriz-
ing the appointment of regional administrators 
and wardens. 
64-13-14. Secure correctional facilities. 
(1) The department shall maintain and operate secure correctional facili-
ties for the incarceration of offenders. 
For each compound of secure correctional facilities, as established by the 
executive director, wardens shall be appointed as the chief administrative 
officers by the executive director. 
(2) The department may transfer offenders from one correctional facility to 
another and may, with the consent of the sheriff, transfer any offender to a 
county jail. 
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History: C. 1953, 64-13-14, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
1985, ch. 211, § 9; 1987, ch. 116, § 8. ment rewrote this section. 
64-13-14.5. Limits of confinement place — Release status 
— Work release. 
(1) The department may extend the limits of the place of confinement of an 
inmate when, as established by department policies and procedures, there is 
cause to believe the inmate will honor his trust, by authorizing him under 
prescribed conditions: 
(a) to leave temporarily for purposes specified by department policies 
and procedures to visit specifically designated places for a period not to 
exceed 30 days; 
(b) to participate in a voluntary training program in the community 
while housed at a correctional facility or to work at paid employment; 
(c) to be housed in a nonsecure community correctional center operated 
by the department; or 
(d) to be housed in any other facility under contract with the depart-
ment. 
(2) The department shall establish rules governing offenders on release 
status. A copy of the rules shall be furnished to the offender and to any 
employer or other person participating in the offender's release program. Any 
employer or other participating person shall agree in writing to abide by the 
rules and to notify the department of the offender's discharge or other release 
from a release program activity, or of any violation of the rules governing 
release status. 
(3) The willful failure of an inmate to remain within the extended limits of 
his confinement or to return within the time prescribed to an institution or 
facility designated by the department is an escape from custody. 
(4) If an offender is arrested for the commission of a crime, the arresting 
authority shall immediately notify the department of the arrest. 
(5) The department may impose appropriate sanctions upon offenders who 
violate rules, including prosecution for escape under Section 76-8-309 and for 
unauthorized absence. 
(6) An inmate who is housed at a nonsecure correctional facility and on 
work release may not be required to work for less than the current federally 
established minimum wage, or under substandard working conditions. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-14.5, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 116, § 9. 
64-13-14.7. Victim notification of offender's release. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Offender" means a person who committed an act of criminally 
injurious conduct against the victim and has been sentenced to incarcera-
tion in the custody of the department. 
(b) "Victim" means a person against whom an offender committed 
criminally injurious conduct as defined in Section 63-63-2, and who is 
entitled to notice of hearings regarding the offender's parole under Sec-
tion 77-27-9.5. "Victim" includes the legal guardian of a victim, or the 
representative of the family of a victim who is deceased. 
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(2) (a) A victim shall be notified of an offender's release under Section 
64-13-14.5, or any other release to or from a half-way house, to a program 
outside of the prison such as a rehabilitation program, state hospital, 
community center other than a release on parole, commutation or termi-
nation for which notice is provided under Section 77-27-9.5, transfer of 
the offender to an out-of-state facility, or an offender's escape, upon sub-
mitting a signed written request of notification to the Department of 
Corrections. The request shall include a current mailing address and may 
include current telephone numbers if the victim chooses. 
(b) The department shall advise the victim of an offender's release or 
escape under Subsection (2)(a), in writing. However, if written notice is 
not feasible because the release is immediate or the offender escapes, the 
department shall make a reasonable attempt to notify the victim by tele-
phone if the victim has provided a telephone number under Subsection 
(2)(a) and shall follow up with a written notice. 
(3) Notice of victim rights under this section shall be provided to the victim 
in the notice of hearings regarding parole under Section 77-27-9.5. The de-
partment shall coordinate with the Board of Pardons to ensure the notice is 
implemented. 
(4) A victim's request for notification under this section and any notifica-
tion to a victim under this section is private information that the department 
may not release: 
(a) to the offender under any circumstances; or 
(b) to any other party without the written consent of the victim. 
(5) The department may make rules as necessary to implement this section. 
(6) The department or its employees acting within the scope of their em-
ployment are not civilly or criminally liable for failure to provide notice or 
improper notice under this section unless the failure or impropriety is willful 
or grossly negligent. 
History: C. 1953,64-13-14.7, enacted by L. came effective on April 29, 1991, pursuant to 
1991, ch. 11, § 1. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 11 be-
64-13-15. Property of offender — Storage and disposal. 
(1) (a) Offenders may retain personal property at correctional facilities 
only as authorized by the department. An offender's property which is 
retained by the department shall be inventoried and placed in storage by 
the department and a receipt for the property shall be issued to the of-
fender. Offenders shall be required to arrange for disposal of property 
retained by the department within a reasonable time under department 
rules. Property retained by the department shall be returned to the of-
fender at discharge, or in accordance with Title 75, Utah Uniform Probate 
Code, in the case of death prior to discharge. 
(b) If property is not claimed within one year of discharge, or it is not 
disposed of by the offender within a reasonable time after the depart-
ment's order to arrange for disposal, it becomes property of the state and 
may be used for correctional purposes or donated to a charity within the 
state. 
(c) If an inmate's property is not claimed within one year of his death, 
it becomes the property of the state in accordance with Section 75-2-105. 
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(d) Funds which are contraband and in the physical custody of any 
prisoner, whether in the form of currency and coin which are legal tender 
in any jurisdiction or negotiable instruments drawn upon a personal or 
business account, shall be subject to forfeiture following a hearing which 
accords with prevailing standards of due process. All such forfeited funds 
shall be used by the department for purposes which promote the general 
welfare of prisoners in the custody of the department. Money and negotia-
ble instruments taken from offenders' mail under department rule and 
which are not otherwise contraband shall be placed in an account admin-
istered by the department, to the credit of the offender who owns the 
money or negotiable instruments. 
(2) Upon discharge from a secure correctional facility, the department may 
give an inmate transition funds in an amount established by the department 
with the approval of the director of the Division of Finance. At its discretion, 
the department may spend the funds directly on the purchase of necessities or 
transportation for the discharged inmate. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-15, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 211, § 10; 1987, ch. 116, § 10; 1988, 
ch. 191, § 1; 1991, ch. 124, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, in Subsection (1), substituted references 
to "offender" for references to "inmate" 
throughout the subsection, substituted "per-
sonal property at correctional facilities only as 
authorized" for "property only as is authorized" 
in the first sentence, made a punctuation 
change in the third sentence, substituted "one 
year" for "two years" and "and may be used for 
correctional purposes or donated to a charity 
within the state" for "consistent with the provi-
sions of Chapter 44, Title 78" in the fourth sen-
tence, and rewrote the last sentence; in Subsec-
tion (2), substituted "a secure correctional fa-
cility, the department may give an inmate" for 
"prison, inmates shall receive" in the first sen-
tence, substituted "its discretion, the depart-
ment may spend the funds" for "the discretion 
of the department, the funds may be spent" in 
the second sentence, and added "for the dis-
charged inmate" to the end of the subsection. 
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 
1988, in Subsection (1) divided the subsection 
into the present paragraphs and added the des-
ignations; in Subsection (l)(a), inserted the 
third sentence and, in the fourth sentence, sub-
stituted at the beginning "Property retained by 
the department" for "The property"; in Subsec-
tion (1Kb), inserted "or it is not disposed of by 
the offender within a reasonable time"; and, in 
Subsection (l)(c), deleted "held by the depart-
ment" following "instruments" at the end of 
the subsection. 
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 
1991, substituted "shall be required" for "may 
be required" in the third sentence and "in ac-
cordance with Title 75, Utah Uniform Probate 
Code" for "to the offender's legal representa-
tive" in the fourth sentence in Subsection 
(l)(a); deleted "death or" after "year of and 
inserted "after the department's order to ar-
range for disposal" in Subsection (1Kb); and 
added present Subsection (l)(c) and the first 
two sentences in Subsection QKd) making for-
mer Subsection (l)(c) the final sentence in Sub-
section UKd) and substituting "offenders' mail 
under department rule and which are not oth-
erwise contraband" for "offenders or from their 
mail under department rule" therein. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of prision 
regulation of inmates' possession of personal 
property, 66 A.L.R.4th 800. 
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64-13-16. Inmate employment. 
. Unless incapable of employment because of sickness or other infirmity or 
for security reasons, the department may employ inmates to the degree that 
funding and available resources allow. An offender may not be employed on 
work which benefits any employee or officer of the department. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-16, enacted by L. ployed on a regular basis, as is practicable" at 
1985, ch. 211, § 11; 1987, cb. 116, § 11. the end of the first sentence, substituted "An 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- offender may not" for "No inmate may" at the 
ment substituted "the department may employ beginning of the second sentence, and deleted 
inmates to the degree that funding and avail- the former third, fourth, and last sentences, 
able resources allow" for "inmates shall be em-
64-13-17. Visitors to correctional facilities — Correspon-
dence. 
(1) (a) The following persons may visit correctional facilities without the 
consent of the department: the governor; attorney general; judges of the 
circuit, district, and appellate courts; members of the Corrections Advi-
sory Council; members of the Board of Pardons; members of the Legisla-
ture; and any other persons authorized under rules prescribed by the 
department or court order. 
(b) Any person acting under a court order may visit or correspond with 
any inmate without the consent of the department. 
(c) The department may limit access to correctional facilities when the 
department or governor declares an emergency or when there is a riot or 
other disturbance. 
(2) A person may not visit with any offender at any correctional facility, 
other than under Subsection (1), without the consent of the department. Of-
fenders and all visitors may be required to submit to a search or inspection of 
their persons and properties as a condition of visitation. 
(3) Offenders housed at any correctional facility may send and receive cor-
respondence, subject to the rules of the department. All correspondence is 
subject to search, consistent with department rules. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-17, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 211, § 12; 1987, ch. 116, § 12. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment divided Subsection (1) into present Sub-
sections (l)(a) and (1Kb) and added present 
Subsection (l)(c); in Subsection (l)(a), substi-
tuted "correctional" for "state prison" near the 
beginning of the subsection; in Subsection (2), 
substituted "A person may not" for "No person 
may", "offender at any correctional facility" for 
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of prison 
regulation of inmates' possession of personal 
property, 66 A.L.R.4th 800. 
"inmate", and "under" for "those provided for 
in" in the first sentence, substituted "Of-
fenders" for "Inmates" and deleted "exercising" 
preceding "visitation" in the second sentence, 
and deleted the former third sentence as set 
out in the bound volume; and, in Subsection 
(3), substituted "Offenders housed at any cor-
rectional facility" for "Inmates" in the first 
sentence. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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64-13-18. Sentence of incarceration. 
The officer delivering any offender for incarceration shall deliver to the 
department a certified copy of the sentence received by the officer from the 
clerk of the court. The department shall give the officer a certificate of deliv-
ery and shall submit to the Board of Pardons a copy of the commitment order. 
The certified copy of sentence is conclusive evidence of the facts contained in 
it. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-18, enacted by L. 
1985, ch, 211, § 13. 
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985, 
ch. 211, § 13 repeals former § 64-13-18, as 
enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, § 18, relating 
to repair of damaged property, and enacts the 
above section. 
Cross-References. Pardons and paroles, 
Chapter 27 of Title 77. 
{ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
64-13-19. Labor at correctional facilities. 
The department shall determine the types of labor to be pursued, and what 
kind, quality, and quantity of goods, materials, and supplies shall be pro-
duced, manufactured, or repaired at correctional facilities. Contracts may be 
made for the labor of offenders, including contracts with any federal agency 
for a project affecting national defense. As many offenders as practicable may 
be employed to produce, manufacture, or repair any goods, materials, or sup-
plies for sale to the state or its political subdivisions. Prices for all goods, 
materials, and supplies shall be fixed by the department. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-19, enacted by L. "the prisons" at the end of the first sentence 
1985, ch. 211, § 14; 1987, ch. 116, § 13. and "offenders" for "inmates" in the second and 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- third sentences, and inserted "sale to" in the 
ment substituted "correctional facilities" for third sentence. 
64-13-20. Investigative services — Presentence investiga-
tions and diagnostic evaluations. 
(1) The department shall: 
(a) provide investigative and diagnostic services and prepare reports 
to: 
(i) assist the courts in sentencing; 
(ii) assist the Board of Pardons in its decision-making responsibili-
ties regarding offenders; 
(iii) assist the department in managing offenders; and 
(iv) assure the professional and accountable management of the 
department; 
(b) establish standards for providing investigative and diagnostic ser-
vices based on available resources, giving priority to felony cases; 
(c) employ staff for the purpose of conducting: 
(i) thorough presentence investigations of the social, physical, and 
mental conditions and backgrounds of offenders; 
(ii) examinations when required by the court or Board of Pardons; 
and 
(iii) thorough diagnostic evaluations of offenders as the court finds 
necessary to supplement the presentence investigation report under 
Section 76-3-404. 
(2) The department may provide recommendations concerning appropriate 
measures to be taken regarding offenders. 
(3) (a) The presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports 
prepared by the department are confidential as defined in Section 77-18-1 
and after sentencing may not be released except by express court order or 
by rules made by the Department of Corrections. 
(b) The reports are intended only for use by: 
(i) the court in the sentencing process; 
(ii) the Board of Pardons in its decision-making responsibilities; 
and 
(iii) the department in the supervision, confinement, and treat-
ment of the offender. 
(4) Presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports shall be 
made available upon request to other correctional programs within the state if 
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the offender who is the subject of the report has been committed or is being 
evaluated for commitment to the facility for treatment as a condition of proba-
tion or parole. 
(5) (a) The presentence investigation reports shall include a victim impact 
statement in all felony cases and in misdemeanor cases if the defendant 
caused bodily harm or death to the victim. 
(b) Victim impact statements shall: 
(i) identify the victim of the offense; 
(ii) itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of 
the offense; 
(iii) identify any physical, mental, or emotional injuries suffered 
by the victim as a result of the offense, and the seriousness and 
permanence; 
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or famil-
ial relationships as a result of the offense; 
(v) identify any request for mental health services initiated by the 
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and 
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the 
offense upon the victim or the victim's family that the court requires. 
(6) If the victim is deceased; under a mental, physical, or legal disability; or 
otherwise unable to provide the information required under this section, the 
information may be obtained from the personal representative, guardian, or 
family members, as necessary. 
(7) The department shall employ staff necessary to pursue investigations of 
complaints from the public, staff, or offenders regarding the management of 
corrections programs. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-20, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 211, § 15; 1987, ch. 116, § 14; 1991, 
ch. 206, § 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment redesignated Subsections (1) through (3) 
as present Subsections (l)(a) through (DCc), 
Subsection (4) as present Subsections (Did) 
through (l)(f), and Subsection (5) as present 
Subsection (2), respectively; designated the for-
mer introductory language as the introductory 
language of present Subsection (1); substituted 
"investigative services" for "investigative func-
tions," "to assist" for "functions, and" preced-
ing "the Board of Pardons" and "offenders" for 
"the offender" and inserted "to assist" preced-
ing "the department" in the introductory lan-
guage of Subsection (1); deleted "subject to the 
limitations of Subsection 64-13-15 (1)" from 
the end of the first sentence of Subsection 
(1Kb); substituted "regarding" for "on behalf 
of in the second sentence of Subsection (l)(b); 
deleted the former third sentence of Subsection 
(1Kb) as set out in the bouna volume; rewrote 
Subsection (l)(c); deleted "the defendant, his 
attorney, the state's attorney, and" preceding 
"other correctional programs" in Subsection 
(l)(d); redesignated Subsections (4)(a) through 
(4)(f) as present Subsections (l)(e)(i) through 
(lXeXvi); substituted "and" for "along with" in 
Subsection (lXeXiii). 
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 
1991, rewrote Subsection (1) as Subsections (1) 
through (6), adding or changing the subsection 
designations, adding Subsections (lXeXiii) and 
(3)(b), inserting references to "diagnostic ser-
vices" in Subsections (lXa) and QXb), inserting 
references to "presentence diagnostic evalua-
tion and investigation reports" in Subsections 
(3)(a) and (4), substituting the language begin-
ning with "as defined" in Subsection (3)(a) for 
"under Chapter 2, Title 63, regarding informa-
tion practices," and making several stylistic 
changes throughout Subsections (1) through 
(6), and redesignated Subsection (2) as Subsec-
tion (7). 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
64-13-21. Supervision of sentenced offenders placed in 
community. 
The department, except as otherwise provided by law, shall supervise sen-
tenced offenders placed in the community on probation by the courts, on pa-
role by the Board of Pardons, or upon acceptance for supervision under the 
terms of the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Proba-
tioners. Standards for the supervision of offenders shall be established by the 
department, giving priority, based on available resources, to felony offenders. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-21, enacted by L. ment rewrote the first sentence and made a 
1985, ch. 211, § 16; 1987, ch. 116, § 15. minor phraseology change in the second sen-
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- tence. 
64-13-22. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1987, ch. 116, § 28 repeals § 17, relating to community-based programs, 
§ 64-13-22, as enacted by Laws 1985, ch. 211, effective April 27, 1987. 
64-13-23. Offender's income and finances. 
The department may require each offender, while in the custody of the 
department or while on probation or parole, to place funds received or earned 
by him from any source into an account administered by the department or 
into a joint account with the department at a federally insured financial 
institution. 
(1) The department may require each offender to maintain a minimum 
balance in either or both accounts for the particular offender's use upon 
discharge from the custody of the department or upon completion of pa-
role or probation. 
(2) If the funds are placed in a joint account at a federally insured 
financial institution: 
(a) any interest accrues to the benefit of the offender account; and 
(b) the department may require that the signatures of both the 
offender and a departmental representative be submitted to the fi-
nancial institution to withdraw funds from the account. 
(3) If the funds are placed in an account administered by the depart-
ment, the department may by rule designate a certain portion of the 
offender's funds as interest-bearing savings, and another portion as non-
interest-bearing to be used for day-to-day expenses. 
(4) The department may withhold part of the offender's funds in either 
account for expenses of incarceration, supervision, or treatment; for court-
ordered restitution, reparation, fines, alimony, support payments or simi-
lar court-ordered payments; for department-ordered restitution; and for 
any other debt to the state. 
(5) (a) Offenders shall not be granted free process in civil actions, in-
cluding petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, if, at any time from the 
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date the cause of action arose through the date the cause of action 
remains pending, there are any funds in either account which have 
not been withheld or are not subject to withholding under Subsection 
(3) or (4). 
(b) The amount assessed for the filing fee, service of process and 
other fees and costs shall not exceed the total amount of funds the 
offender has in excess of the indigence threshold established by the 
department but not less than $25 including the withholdings under 
Subsection (3) or (4) during the identified period of time. 
(c) The amounts assessed shall not exceed the regular fees and 
costs provided by law. 
(6) The department may disclose information on offender accounts to 
the Office of Recovery Services and other appropriate state agencies. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-23, enacted by L. ceived or earned by him from any source" for 
1987, ch. 116, § 16; 1991, ch. 125, § 1; 19192, "his income from employment while in the cus-
ch. 217, § 1. tody of the department or while on probation or 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1987, parole" in the introductory paragraph and de-
ch. 116, § 16 repeals former § 64-13-23, as en- leted "in its discretion" after "department 
acted by Laws 1985, ch. 211, § 18, relating to may" in Subsection (5). 
compensation for inmate employment, and The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 
enacts the present section. 1992, inserted "the funds are" after "If" in Sub-
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- sections (2) and (3); made a stylistic change in 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted "while Subsection (4); added Subsection (5); and redes-
in the custody of the department or while on ignated former Subsection (5) as Subsection 
probation or parole" and substituted "funds re- (6). 
64-13-24- Standards for staff training. 
To assure the safe and professional operation of correctional programs, the 
department shall establish policies setting minimum standards for the basic 
training of all stafiF upon employment, and the subsequent regular training of 
staff. The training standards of correctional officers who are designated as 
peace officers shall be not less than those established by the Peace Officer 
Standards and Training Council. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-24, enacted by L. and made a punctuation change in the first 
1986, ch. 211, § 19; 1987, ch. 116, § 17. sentence; and inserted "correctional officers 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- who are designated as" and substituted "shall 
ment substituted "staff upon employment" for be not" for "may not be" in the second sentence, 
"newly employed staff," inserted "subsequent," 
64-13-25. Standards for programs. 
(1) To promote accountability and to ensure safe and professional operation 
of correctional programs, the department shall establish minimum standards 
for the organization and operation of its programs. 
(a) The standards shall be promulgated according to state rulemaking 
provisions. Those standards that apply to offenders are exempt from the 
provisions of Title 63, Chapter 46a, the Utah Administrative Rulemaking 
Act. Offenders are not a class of persons under that act. 
(b) Standards shall provide for inquiring into and processing offender 
complaints. 
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(2) There shall be an audit for compliance with standards according to 
policies and procedures established by the department, for continued opera-
tion of correctional programs. 
(a) At least every three years, the department shall internally audit all 
programs for compliance with established standards. 
(b) All financial statements and accounts of the department shall be 
reviewed during the audit. Written review shall be provided to the man-
agers of the programs and the executive director of the department. 
(c) The reports shall be classified as confidential internal working pa-
pers and access is available at the discretion of the executive director or 
the governor, or upon court order. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-25, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 211, § 20; 1987, ch. 116, § 18. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "its" for "the" near the end of 
the introductory paragraph of Subsection (1); 
deleted "and shall encompass all aspects of the 
department operations" from the end of the 
first sentence of Subsection (l)(a); added the 
second sentence of Subsection (l)(a); deleted "a 
means o r preceding "inquiring" in Subsection 
(l)(b); substituted 'There shall be an audit for" 
for "Certification of and a comma for "is re-
quired" in the introductory paragraph of Sub-
section (2); substituted "three years" for "two 
years" and "for compliance" for "and certify 
compliance or noncompliance" in Subsection 
(2)(a); substituted "available at the discretion 
of the executive director or the governor, or 
upon court order" for "governed by the State 
Information Practices Act" in Subsection (2)(c); 
and deleted former Subsection (2)(d), denying 
certification to programs not complying with 
standards. 
64-13-26. Private providers of services. 
(1) The department may contract with private providers or other agencies 
for the provision of care, treatment, and supervision of offenders committed to 
the care and custody of the department. 
(2) (a) The department shall: 
(i) establish standards for the operation of the programs; and 
(ii) annually review the programs for compliance. 
(b) The reviews shall be classified as confidential internal working 
papers. 
(c) Access to records regarding the reviews is available upon the discre-
tion of the executive director or the governor, or upon court order. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-26, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 211, § 21; 1987, ch. 116, § 19; 1989, 
ch. 224, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment substituted 'The department may con-
tract" for "Nothing in this chapter prohibits 
the department from contracting" and "re-
viewed for compliance with standards set by 
the department" for "certified to be in compli-
ance with the departmental standards" in the 
first sentence, added "and annually thereafter" 
to the end of the first sentence, and added the 
second and third sentences. 
The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 
1989, designated the first sentence as present 
Subsection (1); deleted "if the programs are re-
viewed for compliance with standards set by 
the department within six months after com-
mencing operation and annually thereafter" at 
the end of Subsection (1); added Subsection 
(2)(a); designated the former second sentence of 
the section as Subsection (2Kb); and designated 
the former third sentence of the section as Sub-
section (2)(c) and inserted "to records regard-
ing the reviews" therein. 
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64-13-27. Records — Access. 
(1) (a) The State Bureau of Criminal Identification, county attorneys' of-
fices, and state and local law enforcement agencies shall furnish to the 
department; upon request a copy of records of any person arrested in this 
state. 
(b) The department shall maintain centralized files on all offenders 
under the jurisdiction of the department and make the files available for 
review by other criminal justice agencies upon request in cases where 
offenders are the subject of active investigations. 
(2) All records maintained by programs under contract to the department 
providing services to public offenders are the property of the department. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-27, enacted by L. and, in Subsection (2), deleted "and shall be 
1985, ch. 211, § 22; 1987, ch. 116, § 20; 1989, returned to it when the offender is terminated 
ch. 224, § 3. from the program" at the end of the present 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- provision and a second sentence that read 'The 
ment deleted "public" preceding "offenders" in department shall maintain an accurate audit 
the second sentence of Subsection (2).
 r e c o r d o f i n f o r m a t ion provided to other pro-
, J S V 9 8 9 f ™ ? d x ? m t ' effective April 24,
 o r i e s regarding offenders under 
1989, designated the first and second sentences
 i t g jurisdiction » 
of Subsection (1) as Subsections (l)(a) and (b) 
64-13-28. Hearings involving staff or offenders. 
(1) The department shall maintain an administrative hearing office to con-
* duct hearings regarding offenders in the custody of the department, issues 
involving staff, or any other administrative matters as assigned by the execu-
tive director of the Department of Corrections. The hearing officer may issue 
subpoenas, compel attendance of witnesses and the production of books, pa-
pers, and other documents, administer oaths, and take testimony under oath. 
(2) The hearing officer shall maintain a summary record of all hearings and 
provide timely written notice to participants of the decision and the reasons 
for the decision. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-28, enacted by L. the first sentence of Subsection (1), substituted 
1985, ch. 211, § 23; 1987, ch. 116, § 21; 1988, "hearings regarding offenders in the custody of 
ch. 191, § 2. the department, issues involving staff, or any 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- other administrative matters as assigned by 
ment substituted "may issue" for "shall be ap- the executive director of the Department of 
pointed by the executive director and has the Corrections" for "investigative hearings re-
power to issue" in the second sentence. garding offenders under supervision, staff mat-
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, ters in dispute, or other administrative mat-
1988, divided the former provisions into ters in dispute"; and, in Subsection (2), in-
present Subsection (1) and Subsection (2); in serted "timely." 
64-13-29. Violation of parole or probation — Detention — 
Hearing. 
(1) The department shall ensure that the court is notified of violations of 
the terms and conditions of probation in the case of probationers under the 
department's supervision, or the Board of Pardons in the case of parolees 
under the department's supervision. In cases where the department desires to 
detain an offender alleged to have violated his parole or probation and where 
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it is unlikely that the Board of Pardons or court will conduct a hearing within 
a reasonable time to determine if the offender has violated his conditions of 
parole or probation, the department shall hold an administrative hearing 
within a reasonable time, unless the hearing is waived by the parolee or 
probationer, to determine if there is probable cause to believe that a violation 
has occurred. If there is a conviction for a crime based on the same charges as 
the probation or parole violation, or a finding by a federal or state court that 
there is probable cause to believe that an offender has committed a crime 
based on the same charges as the probation or parole violation, the depart-
ment need not hold its administrative hearing. 
(2) The appropriate officer or officers of the department shall, as soon as 
practical following the department's administrative hearing, report to the 
court or the Board of Pardons, furnishing a summary of the hearing, and may 
make recommendations regarding the disposition to be made of the parolee or 
probationer. Pending any proceeding under this section, the department may 
take custody of and detain the parolee or probationer involved for a period not 
to exceed 72 hours excluding weekends and holidays. 
(3) If the hearing officer determines that there is probable cause to believe 
that the offender has violated the conditions of his parole or probation, the 
department may detain the offender for a reasonable period of time after the 
hearing or waiver, as necessary to arrange for the incarceration of the of-
fender. Written order of the department is sufficient authorization for any 
peace officer to incarcerate the offender. The department may promulgate 
rules for the implementation of this section. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-29, enacted by L. suant to" and deleted 'prior to the hearing" 
1985, ch. 211, § 24; 1987, ch. 116, § 22. following "holidays" in the second sentence of 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- Subsection (2); substituted "the hearing officer 
ment divided the section into subsections; sub- determines that there is probable cause to De-
stituted "violations" for "any violation/' "pro- i i e v e that the offender has violated the condi-
bation" for "supervision," "probationers under t j ^
 0f m s p a r o l e o r probation, the department 
the department's" for "probation offenders un-
 d e t a m t h e o f f e n d e r» f o r « i t a p p e a r s to t h e 
der probation and parolees under the depart-
 h e a n o f f i c e r Qr o f f i c e r s t h a t retaki o r 
ments ^ ' ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ reincarceration is likely to follow, the parolee 
sentence of Subsection (1); substituted the Ian- , . , j : . _,„ ,
 w. 
guage beginning "In cases where the depart- or probationer may be detained and mcarcer-
ment desires" and ending "his conditions of pa- a t l o n o f the offender for retaking or 
role or probation" for "Prior to giving any noti- reincarceration m the first sentence of Sub-
fication" and "probable cause" for "reasonable section (3); substituted incarcerate the of-
cause" in the second sentence of Subsection (1); fender" for "effect retaking or reincarceration" 
added the third sentence of Subsection (1); sub- i n t n e second sentence of Subsection (3); and 
stituted "the department's administrative substituted "may promulgate rules" for "is au-
hearing" for "termination of any hearing" and thorized to promulgate appropriate policies 
"may make" for "making" in the first sentence and procedures" in the last sentence of Subsec-
of Subsection (2); substituted "under" for "pur- tion (3). 
64-13-30. Expenses incurred by offenders — Payment to 
department. 
(1) The department shall establish and collect from offenders on work re-
lease programs reasonable costs of maintenance, transportation, and inciden-
tal expenses incurred by the department on behalf of the offenders. Priority 
shall be given to restitution and family support obligations. 
(2) The department, under its rules, may advance funds to any offender as 
necessary to establish the offender in a work release program. 
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History: C. 1963, 64-13-30, enacted by L. (1) and substituted "its rules" for "rules it pre-
1986, ch. 211, § 25; 1987, ch. 116, § 23. scribes" and made a punctuation change in 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- Subsection (2). 
ment deleted the second sentence of Subsection 
64-13-31. Emergencies. 
In the case of riots, disturbances, or other emergencies at correctional facili-
ties, the Department of Corrections has authority to direct the resolution of 
the emergencies. The department may request and coordinate the assistance 
of other state and local agencies in responding to the emergencies. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-31, enacted by L. ment substituted "at" for "in" preceding "cor-
1985, ch. 211, § 26; 1987, ch. 116, § 24. rational facilities" in the first sentence. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
64-13-32. Discipline of offenders — Use of force. 
If an offender offers violence to an officer or other employee of the Depart-
ment of Corrections, or to another offender, or to any other person; attempts to 
damage or damages any corrections property; attempts to escape; or resists or 
refuses to obey any lawful and reasonable command; the officers and other 
employees of the department may use all reasonable means, including the use 
of weapons, to defend themselves and department property and to enforce the 
observance of discipline and prevent; escapes. An inmate in the act of escaping 
from a secure correctional facility is presumptive evidence that he poses a 
threat of death or serious bodily injury to an officer or others if apprehension 
is delayed. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-32, enacted by L. ment substituted "offender, or to any" for "in-
1985, ch. 211, § 27; 1987, ch. 116, § 25. mate or" and made punctuation changes in the 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- first sentence and added the second sentence. 
64-13-33. Restitution for offenses. 
Following an administrative hearing, the department is authorized to re-
quire restitution from an offender for expenses incurred by the department as 
a result of the offender's violation of department rules. The department is 
authorized to require payment from the offender's account or to place a hold 
on it to secure compliance with this section. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-33, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 211, § 28. 
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64-13-34. Safety of offenders. 
In case of disaster or acts of God that threaten the safety of inmates or the 
security of a secure correctional facility, inmates may be moved to a suitable 
place of security. Inmates shall be returned to a correctional facility as soon as 
it is practicable. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-34, enacted by L. who are ill shall receive necessary medical care 
1985, ch. 211, § 29; 1987, ch. 116, § 26. and attention" following "place of security" in 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- the first sentence; and substituted "a correc-
ment substituted wa secure correctional facil- tional facility" for "the prison" and "practica-
ity" for "the prison" and deleted "where those ble" for "safe" in the second sentence. 
64-13-35. Items prohibited in correctional facilities — Pen-
alties. 
(1) Except as provided by department policy, no firearm, dangerous 
weapon, implement of escape, explosive, drug, spirituous or fermented liquor, 
medicine, or poison may be: 
(a) transported to or upon a correctional facility or its appurtenant 
grounds; 
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(b) sold or given away at any correctional facility or in any building 
appurtenant to a secure correctional facility, or on land granted to the 
state for the use and benefit of the department; or 
(c) given to, or used by, any offender at a correctional facility. 
(2) (a) Any person who transports to or upon a correctional facility or its 
appurtenant grounds any firearm, dangerous weapon, implement of es-
cape, or explosive, with intent to provide or sell it to any offender, is 
guilty of a second degree felony. 
(b) Any person who provides or sells to any offender at a correctional 
facility any firearm, dangerous weapon, implement of escape, or explo-
sive, is guilty of a second degree felony. 
(c) Any offender who possesses at a correctional facility any firearm, 
dangerous weapon, implement of escape, or explosive, is guilty of a second 
degree felony. 
(3) As used in this section, "drug" means any chemical or physical sub-
stance in any of its physical or chemical states as defined in the Controlled 
Substances Act. 
(4) Penalties for drug violations under this section are as provided in Sec-
tion 58-37-8, Controlled Substances Act. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-35, enacted by L. "secure correctional facility" for "prison," and 
1985, ch. 211, § 30; 1987, ch. 116, § 27; 1990, "the department" for "prisons" in Subsection 
ch. 238, § 1. (1Kb); substituted "offender at a correctional 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- facility" for "inmate in the prison except under 
ment substituted "by department policy, no direction of department medical authorities" in 
firearm, dangerous weapon, explosive" for "m Subsection (l)(c); and rewrote Subsection (2). 
Subsection (2), no and made a punctuation
 The 1 9 9 Q ameJldmmiU e f f e c t i v e A p r i l 2 3 , 
change in the introductory language of Subsec-
 1 9 9 0 i n s e r t e d ... l e m e n t o f e» t h r o u g h . 
tion (1); substituted a correctiona facili y or ^ ^ ^ ^
 a d d e d S u b s e c t i o n (4)> 
its appurtenant grounds for "corrections ~
 n - « . - c * i 
premises" in Subsection (l)(a); substituted "at ^ t ^ Z ^ V a ^ n ! 8 ^ 1 ^ 
any correctional facility" for "in any prison", m e s ' §§ 7 6 - 3 - 2 0 1 ' 7 6 - 3 - 2 0 3 ' 7 6 - 3 - 3 0 1 ' 
64-13-36. Testing of prisoners for AIDS and HIV infection 
— Segregation — Medical care — Department au-
thority. 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "Prisoner" means a person who has been adjudicated and found 
guilty of a criminal offense, who is in the custody of and under the juris-
diction of the department. 
(b) "Test" or "testing" means a test or tests for Acquired Immunodefi-
ciency Syndrome or Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection in accor-
dance with standards recommended by the Department of Health. 
(2) (a) Within 90 days after July 1, 1989, the effective date of this act, the 
department shall test or provide for testing of all prisoners who are under 
the jurisdiction of the department, and subsequently test or provide for 
testing of all prisoners who are committed to the jurisdiction of the de-
partment upon admission or within a reasonable period after admission. 
(b) At the time that test results are provided to persons tested, the 
department shall provide education and counseling regarding Acquired 
Immunodeficiency Syndrome and Human Immunodeficiency Virus infec-
tion. 
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. (3) (a) The results of tests conducted under Subsection (2) shall become 
part of the inmate's medical file, accessible only to persons designated by 
the department by rule, and in accordance with any other legal require-
ment for reporting of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome or Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus infection. 
(b) Medical and epidemiological information regarding results of tests 
conducted under Subsection (2) shall be provided to the Department of 
Health. 
(4) (a) The department shall house prisoners who test positive for Acquired 
Immunodeficiency Syndrome or Human Immunodeficiency Virus infec-
tion in a single cell or room or provide for segregation of that person from 
members of the prison population. No person who tests negative for Ac-
quired Immunodeficiency Syndrome or Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
infection may be placed or housed in a cell or room with a person who has 
tested positive for either of those conditions, except upon his written 
request. 
(b) The department shall provide reasonable and adequate medical 
care for members of the prison population who test positive for Acquired 
Immunodeficiency Syndrome or Human Immunodeficiency Virus infec-
tion. 
(c) The department has authority to take action with regard to any 
prisoner who has tested positive for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syn-
drome or Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection, as it deems reason-
able and necessary for the safety and security of the prison population 
and prison staff. 
(d) This subsection does not require or suggest that prisoners who test 
positive for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome or Human Immunode-
ficiency Virus infection be placed in separate cell blocks or cell areas 
separate from the general prison population, unless such separation is 
medically necessary for the protection of the general prison population or 
staff. 
(e) Prisoners who test positive for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syn-
drome or Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection may not be excluded 
from common areas of the prison that are accessible to other prisoners, 
solely on the basis of that condition, unless it is medically necessary for 
protection of the general prison population or staff. 
(5) If the department complies with Subsections (2), (3), and (4) it shall be 
considered to have discharged its duty and to have taken reasonable and 
necessary precautions to prevent transmission of Acquired Immunodeficiency 
Syndrome and Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-36, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 234, § 2 
1989, ch. 234, § 1. makes the act effective on July 1, 1989. 
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77-18-1 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Section Section 
of order — Redaction — Receipt 77-18-15. Retention of expunged records —-
of order — Administrative pro- Fee — Agencies. 
ceedings — Division require- 77-18-16. Penalty. 
ments. 77-18-17. Retroactive application. 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance 
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence in-
vestigation — Standards — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termina-
tion, revocation, modification, or extension — 
Hearings. 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in coiyunction 
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction 
of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution 
of sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the 
defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Cor-
rections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a 
private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing 
court. 
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the Department of Corrections. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. The court has 
continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3) (a) The Department of Corrections shall establish supervision and 
presentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the 
department. These standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the Department of Corrections to 
determine what level of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submit-
ted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an 
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the Department 
of Corrections. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures 
to implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider 
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and 
other criteria as they consider appropriate. 
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THE JUDGMENT 77-18-1 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an 
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations 
subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the Department of Corrections 
is not required to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C 
misdemeanors or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports 
on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may 
supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with depart-
ment standards. 
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of 
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a 
presentence investigation report from the Department of Corrections or 
information from other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact 
statement describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's 
family. The victim impact statement shall: 
(i) identify the victim of the offense; 
(ii) include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompa-
nied by a recommendation from the Department of Corrections 
regarding the payment of restitution by the defendant; 
(iii) identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of 
the offense along with its seriousness and permanence; 
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial 
relationships as a result of the offense; 
(v) identify any request for psychological services initiated by the 
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and 
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the 
offense upon the victim or the victim's family that is relevant to the 
trial court's sentencing determination. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific state-
ment of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the 
Department of Corrections regarding the payment of restitution by the 
defendant. 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any 
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, 
are confidential and are not available except by court order for purposes of 
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the 
Department of Corrections. 
(6) The Department of Corrections shall make the presentence investigation 
report available for review at the court ten days in advance of sentencing and 
shall mail or deliver copies to the defendant, defendant's attorney, and 
prosecutor ten days in advance of sentencing. Any inaccuracies in the presen-
tence investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and 
Department of Corrections prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the 
attention of the sentencing judge, and a determination of relevance or accuracy 
shall be made by the judge on the record. If a party fails to raise an objection 
at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, 
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
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77-18-1 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant may 
be required to perform any or all of the following: 
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(b) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs; 
(c) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
(d) participate in available treatment programs; 
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year; 
(f) serve a term of home confinement; 
(g) participate in community service restitution programs, including 
the community service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7; 
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims in accordance 
with Subsections 76-3-201(3) and (4); and 
(j) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appro-
priate. 
(9) (a) The Department of Corrections is responsible, upon order of the 
court, for the collection of fines, restitution, and any other costs assessed 
under Section 64-13-21 during the probation period in cases for which the 
court orders supervised probation by the department. 
(b) The prosecutor shall provide notice of the restitution order to the 
clerk of the court;. 
(c) The clerk shall place the order on the civil docket and shall provide 
notice of the order to the parties. 
(d) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be tenninated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B 
or C misdemeanors or infractions. 
(ii) If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the proba-
tion period, owes outstanding fines, restitution, or other assessed 
costs, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the 
defendant on bench probation or place the defendant on bench 
probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of fines, 
restitution, and other amounts outstanding. 
(iii) Upon motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its own 
motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his 
failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court or why the 
suspended jail or prison term should not be imposed. 
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court and 
prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination 
of supervised probation will occur by law. The notification shall include a 
probation progress report and complete report of details on outstanding 
fines, restitution, and other amounts outstanding. 
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing 
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total 
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to 
revoke the probation. 
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(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated 
at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or 
warrant by the court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver 
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in 
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court 
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts 
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the 
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit 
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or 
extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to 
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be 
revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior 
to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right 
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel 
appointed for him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations 
of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to 
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause other-
wise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own 
behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, 
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(13) Restitution imposed under this chapter is considered a debt for willful 
and malicious injury for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bank-
ruptcy as provided in Title 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 523, 1985. 
(14) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of 
the Division of Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a 
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77-18-1 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the 
Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at 
the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) that persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2)(g) are receiving 
priority for treatment over the defendants described in this subsection. 
(15) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic 
evaluations, are classified private in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 1, 
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the 
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the 
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the 
presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by 
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of 
the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; or 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or 
the subject's authorized representative. 
History: C. 1953, 77-18-1, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 59, § 2; 1982, ch. 
9, § 1; 1983, ch. 47, § 1; 1983, ch. 68, § 1; 
1983, ch. 85, § 2; 1984, ch. 20, § 1; 1985, ch. 
212, § 17; 1985, ch. 229, § 1; 1987, ch. 114, 
§ 1; 1989, ch. 226, § 1; 1990, ch. 134, § 2; 
1991, ch. 66, § 5; 1991, ch. 206, § 6; 1992, ch. 
14, § 3; 1993, ch. 82, § 7; 1993, ch. 220, § 3; 
1994, ch. 13, § 24; 1994, ch. 198, § 1; 1994, 
ch. 230, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, added Subsec-
tion (11). 
The 1991 amendment by ch. 66, effective 
April 29, 1991, in present Subsection (2)(a) 
substituted "guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no 
contest" for "guilty or no contest" in the first 
sentence. 
The 1991 amendment by ch. 206, effective 
April 29, 1991, added present Subsection (1), 
redesignating the following subsections accord-
ingly; subdivided Subsections (2)(b), (3), (5Xa), 
(7), (8)(a), (9)(a), and (10); substituted "appro-
priations subcommittee" for "appropriations 
committee" at the end of Subsection (3Xe); 
substituted the language beginning with "pre-
sentence" and ending with "court order" for 
"report are confidential and not available ex-
cept" in Subsection (5)(a)(iii); inserted "evi-
dence" in the first and second sentences of 
Subsection (5)(b); added Subsections (5)(c) and 
(13); and made several punctuation and stylis-
tic changes throughout the section. 
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 
1992, added "including the community service 
program provided in Section 78-11-20.7" to the 
end of Subsection (6Kg). 
The 1993 amendment by ch. 82, effective May 
3,1993, added Subsection (2) and redesignated 
former Subsections (2) through (13) as Subsec-
tions (3) through (14). 
The 1993 amendment by ch. 220, effective 
May 3, 1993, added "and any other costs as-
sessed under Section 64-13-21" in present Sub-
section (8), substituted "owes" for "has" and "or 
other assessed costs" for "owing" and added 
"and other amounts outstanding" in present 
Subsection (9)(a)(ii), substituted "and other 
amounts outstanding" for "orders" in present 
Subsection (9)(b), and made stylistic changes. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 13, effective May 
2, 1994 substituted "Board of Pardons and 
Parole" for "Board of Pardons" in Subsections 
(lXc) and (4Kb); substituted Title 77, Chapter 
2a, Pleas in Abeyance" for "Sections 77-2a-l 
through 77-2a-4" in Subsection (2); substituted 
"Subsection (4)(a)" for "Subsection (a)" in Sub-
section (4)(d); and made stylistic changes. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 198, effective 
May 2, 1994, added Subsection (6)(a)(ii), re-
numbering former Subsections (6)(aXii) and 
(iii) as (iii) and (iv), and made a stylistic change. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 230, effective 
May 2, 1994, deleted former Subsection (1) 
which defined "confidential"; inserted "and Pa-
role" in Subsection (3)(b); added Subsection (6); 
designated former Subsection (6)(b) as Subsec-
tion (7); deleted former Subsection (6)(c) per-
taining to the disposition of the presentence 
investigation report after the sentencing; de-
leted former Subsection (14), relating to disclo-
sure of presentence diagnostic evaluation and 
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the coimty or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and 
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirma-
tion, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing 
to be seized. 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
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IN THE THuflmiiniCIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, By. 
R^LSO DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 1 7 1996 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Plaintiff, 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
Case No. 
Count No. . "X, _ . 
Honorable yOWVfur r * \Wvr,pi>, 
Clerk (V\Q>'T> : 
RApnrtor Nl\A<>D j 3 \ ~h\o OPT! 
Bailiff Y\tXV' 
tlerk 
Defendant. Date [T\<yMP 
D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having 
• plea of no contest; of the offense of Uf^( 
of the \ degree, D ^ class misdem^rTor, being now present in court^ and r#ady for sentence and 
been convicted by At a jury; • the court; D plea of guilty; 
Q\AJ M fr\SV\VAi\(ft , W X ' P ^ ^OJT^^rC^ 0^ , a felony 
a cl a ran rt e
represented by VsfV\ pTft»m and the State being represented byl 0P\j.\frV4' , is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
A^to a maximum mandatory term of 2 _ 
D not to exceed five years; 
• of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
• not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 
years and which may be for 'Ife; 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $. to 
tf such sentence is to run concurrently with tQ^fVr 3SL 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of • State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s) are hereby dismissed. 
30 a D Defendant is gFantea  stay of the above (• prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
d Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County ^ fpr^eiivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, wher^defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
t}^  Commitment shall issue ^ Q - C ^ W A ^ - V W 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DATED this 
DISTRICT OTe«p^iJDGi" 
Defense Counsel 
rtArMitw P.nnntv/ Attnrnev Page. 
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IN THE TfflRD~JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT SALT u*f S£UrrtY 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ^ J ^ l S ^ d l ^ ^ c S 
THE STATE OF UTAH, £ - \ £ ) fe^l °V 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
Plaintiff. (COMMITMENT) 
vs. j Case No. ^ ^ C A l g D f r 
" T n A \ u \ r> ( \ j W v f f t s > Honorable \ b AW rxrrv ~1 \f\Drf\e, 
' J A „,, ,V , I Clerk m ^ S : 
J Bailiff O ig r^> U n e > n w ^ 
Defendant. Date >» - ^ ' <\\9 
D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by tta jury; D the court; D plea of guilty; 
D plea of no contest; of the offense of , a felony 
of the J degree, D a class misdemeanor,, being now present, in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by^~ fo>TD\rO0 , and the State being represented by v (\f)*_\f>\e.r is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
D to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be for life; 
It not to exceed five years; 
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
• of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ • 
• and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
gt such sentence is to run concurrently with yJ\W^ C.frVxH'V ^ -
D such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, • Court, Count(s) are hereby dismissed. 
4 yrg^nvxc, \*^(ynJLrvV \*> fr*-V gM g<^ 
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above (• prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
M Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County^ foi^ ettwwjfctothe Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where/defe'n9a^S^|Wybe confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment, ji 
^ Commitment shall issue VQx-VWvhVo 
DATED this \ 1 day of . ^ vAryc 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
TRICT C&UffE 
nomttw Hnuntv Attorney Paae ^ o f ^ _ 
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JUDGE'S PRISON TERM RECOMMENDATION 
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 77-18-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended 1980,1 recommend that 
the defendant serve months prior to release or parole. 
Comments, including mitigating or aggravating circumstances: 
DATED this n. day of v W o ,19. 
< DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Page ^ o , ^ 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Tony R. Maestas, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JUN 24 1997 
Julia DTUesandro 
Clerk of the Court 
ORDER 
Case No. 960831-CA 
Before Judges Davis, Wilkins, and Jackson. 
This matter is before the court on a Motion for Remand for 
Supplementation of the Record and for Determination of 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, pursuant to Rule 23B of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the case is temporarily remanded 
to the trial court for proceedings in accordance with Rule 23B of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and entry of findings of 
fact regarding appellant•s claim of ineffective assistance of his 
trial counsel.
 / 
Dated this J^j day of June, 1997. 
dge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on June 24, 1997, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was hand-delivered to a personal 
representative of the Legal Defender's Office to be delivered to 
the party listed below: 
Lynn R. Brown 
Rebecca C. Hyde 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
424 E. 500 S., #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand-
delivered to a personal representative of the Attorney General's 
Office to be delivered to the party listed below: 
James H. Beadles 
Assistant Attorney General 
PO Box 140854 
Salt Lake City UT 84114-0854 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited 
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below: 
Honorable William A. Thorne 
Third District Court 
240 E. 400 S. 
Salt Lake City, UT*84111 
Third District Court 
Attn: Suzie Carlson 
240 E. 400 S. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dated this' June 24, 1997. 
„ M/\ki I/J/JU)-
-^ ' Deputy Clerk 
Case No. 960831 
Third District, Salt Lake Dept., Div. I, #921901600 
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:**v 
REBECCA C. HYDE, #6409 piLED DISTRICT COURT r ^ ^ 
Attorney for Defendant Third Judicial District ~ _ 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION ^  Uuv. 1 5 , JS / 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 OEC 2 £ W 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
 ftALT j^gigjNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I 
STATE OF UTAH, FINDINGS OF FACT 
Plaintiff, 
TONY MAESTAS, Case No. 921901600FS 
JUDGE WILLIAM A. THORNE 
Defendant. 
On October 17,1997, an Evidentiary Hearing was held in the above-entitled 
matter pursuant to Rule 23B, Utah R. App. Pro. for the purpose of entering Findings of 
Fact relevant to Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Both parties were 
present. Pursuant to Rule 23B(e), Utah R. App Pro. and based upon the evidence 
presented by Appellant, this Court enters the following Findings of Fact: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Defendant, Tony Maestas, was represented at trial by 
Mr. Victor Gordon. 
2. The Court has reviewed records contained in Tony Waldron's prison 
file maintained by the Utah Department of Corrections. 
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3. Defense counsel gained access to said records pursuant to the 
Government Records Access and Management Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-101 et. sec. 
(1993). 
4. The Court has reviewed records maintained by the Investigations 
Bureau of the Utah Department of Corrections relating to the arrest and conviction of 
Tony Maestas, and the use of Tony Waldron as a confidential informant. 
5. Defense counsel gained access to said records pursuant to the 
Government Records Access and Management Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-101 et. sec. 
(1993). 
6. The aforementioned records contain the following information: 
7. Tony Waldron (Waldron) was committed to the prison on November 
5, 1990, on a conviction of two counts of Forgery, second degree felonies. 
8. Waldron's expected release date from prison was January 14,1993. 
9. As late as February 7, 1992, Waldron's expected release date 
remained unchanged. 
10. On August 15, 1991, Waldron was assigned to work at the prison 
dairy. 
11. On November 26, 1991, Waldron was one of three inmates 
suspected of smuggling drugs at the dairy into D block. 
12. On February 21,1992, Waldron was found to have injection sites on 
his arm. Waldron admitted he had been injecting steroids at the dairy. 
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13. Waldron was recruited by Leo Lucy, an investigator with the 
Department of Corrections to work as a confidential informant. 
14. On March 14, 1992, Waldron was moved from D-block on a 
temporary restriction order because he was "under investigation". 
15. On March 14, 1992, Waldron was released on a home visit where 
he agreed to purchase drugs to be smuggled into the prison as part of an undercover 
operation for the Investigations Bureau of the Department of Corrections. 
16. On March 14,1992, Tony Maestas was arrested for allegedly selling 
cocaine to Tony Waldron. 
17. On April 2,1992, a Special Attention Hearing was held by the Board 
of Pardons. A Special Attention Hearing is a review to grant relief to inmates under 
special circumstances where a change of status may be warranted. 
18. Waldron was paroled that day. He was serving time for ten counts 
of Forgery, second degree felonies, one count of Fraud, a third degree felony, and an 
additional count of Forgery, a third degree felony. 
19. Waldron was never formally disciplined for possession of a controlled 
substance or drug paraphernalia. 
20. Waldron was never charged with Possession of a Controlled 
Substance or Drug Paraphernalia. 
21. Waldron was never charged as a result of the Department of 
Corrections' investigation that began November 26, 1991, of his involvement in 
smuggling drugs into D-block. 
3 
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22. Leo Lucy, the investigator with the Department of Corrections who 
recruited Waldron, in a written statement, claimed that the only compensation Waldron 
received fo his role as a confidential informant was a letter of recommendation to the 
Board of Pardons that Waldron not lose his parole date as a result of a dirty urine test. 
23. A review of Waldron's prison files also revealed the following 
information relevant to his credibility: 
a. Waldron was convicted on September 14, 1992, of Forgery, 
a second degree felony, as well as Aggravated Assault by a Prisoner and Felony 
Fleeing. 
b. Waldron was convicted on December 12,1990, of two counts 
of Forgery, second degree felonies. 
c. On August 7,1986, Waldron was committed to the Utah State 
Prison on one count of Possession of a Forged Writing, a third degree felony, seven 
counts of Forgery, second degree felonies, and one count of Forgery, a third degree 
felony. 
d. Waldron had been assessed by the Department of Corrections 
in 1987 and had been described as an inmate who "cannot be trusted at all". 
e. In October of 1990, Waldron approached Lon Brian with the 
Davis County Metro Narcotics wanting to furnish information. Agent Brian requested use 
of Waldron for an undercover investigation. AP&P determined that "it would not be wise 
to allow him to participate" because of his history of drug dependency and attempted 
escape. Waldron was told "there would be no special consideration". 
4 
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24. Also relevant to Waldron's credibility was the following information 
regarding his experience and skill at obtaining and hiding drugs on his person in the 
prison: 
a. The investigation into Waldron and other inmates that began 
in November of 1991 involved allegations that inmates were smuggling drugs by either 
hiding them in balloons in the mouth, or by "keistering" the drugs by hiding them in the 
anal cavity. 
b. On November 10,1989, Waldron was disciplined for a positive 
urinalysis for marijuana and for hiding a white object in his mouth which he swallowed 
before guards could retrieve it. 
c. On November 20, 1989, Waldron admitted hiding two 
marijuana joints in his mouth while being searched, slipping them from his mouth into 
a "pocket" he had cut inside his coat when the guard was not looking. 
d. On January 1,1988, Waldron was disciplined for Possession 
of a Controlled Substance found hidden in his sock. 
e. On May 29,1988, Waldron was disciplined for possession of 
a controlled substance. 
f. On June 7, 1988, Waldron was disciplined for a positive 
urinalysis for marijuana. 
g. On March 30, 1987, Waldron was disciplined for possession 
of a controlled substance. 
5 
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25. A review of Waldron's prison file also revealed the following 
information suggesting that he had worked as confidential informant in the past: 
a. On July 15,1992, Waldron had safety concerns at the Weber 
County Jail because he had testified against other inmates. 
b. On November 5,1990, Waldron asked to be moved because 
of involvement in past drug dealing at the prison. 
c. Waldron's Offender Reassessment forms indicate he had 
safety concerns in February of 1990 and also in July of 1991. 
26. In respect to the chain of custody in Mr. Maestas' case, it was also 
discovered that money booked into evidence with the alleged cocaine was likely stolen 
by the custodian of the evidence~x 
DATED th is^^T day of December, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
Third District C 
^m^ 
Approved as to form: 
RICHARD S. SHEPHERD^" 
Deputy District Attorney 
REBECCA C. HYDE 
Attorney for Defendant 
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MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the District 
Attorney, 2001 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 this day of 
December, 1997. 
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1 THE COURT: The Court finds there has 
2 been a violation of the terms of the conditions of 
3 probation. That violation was knowing and 
4 intentional under circumstances where the defendant 
5 had the ability to comply with the Court's order on 
6 the conditions of probation. Therefore probation 
7 will be revoked. It will not be reinstated. There 
8 are only so many chances that the Court has the 
9 disposition or the opportunity to grant them in one 
10 case and deny them in another because there are only 
11 limited resources out there. We need to provide 
12 those resources to the people who have indicated they 
13 will take advantage of that. And that is not so in 
14 this case. 
15 I do think, however, given the amount of 
16 delay that has occurred and since the feeling of the 
17 affidavit is in support of the order to show cause 
18 and this is a unique case, the defendant is entitled 
19 to credit for time served in the Salt Lake County 
20 Jail. I would ask the clerk to note specifically in 
21 the minute entry and in the order -- well, you're 
22 going to have to prepare papers for me on this, Mr. 
23 Shepherd. Would you note specifically in there that 
24 the Court is aware of the view of the Department of 
25 Corrections that credit for time served is not 
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1 normally granted by them when the time served is a 
2 result of an order to show cause. And the credit for 
3 time served normally is limited only to pretrial 
4 time. And it's my recommendation that he be given 
5 credit for time served during the pendency of this 
6 matter. 
7 Is there anything else? If not, we'll be 
8 in recess. 
9 (Concluded at 4:45 p.m.) 
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1 HAVE SPONTANEOUS TESTIMONY. 
2 
3 TONY WALDRON. 
4I CALLED AS A WITNESS, BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS 
5 EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
6 
7 DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
8I BY MR. SHEPHERD: 
9 Q. WOULD YOU PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME. 
10 A. TONY WALDRON. 
11 Q. WILL YOU SPELL THAT, PLEASE. 
12 A. W-A-L-D-R-O-N. 
13 Q. MR. WALDRON, ARE YOU PRESENTLY AN INMATE AT 
14 THE UTAH STATE PRISON? 
15 A. YES, I AM. 
16 Q. DIRECTING YOUR ATTENTION TO THE 14TH OF 
17 MARCH OF 1992, WERE YOU AN INMATE ON THAT DATE? 
18 A. YES, I WAS. 
19 Q. AND ON THAT DATE DID YOU ASSIST LEO LUCEY 
20 IN A DEPARTMENT OF OF CORRECTIONS INVESTIGATION 
21 RELATIVE TO ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE SOME PEOPLE WHO 
22 WERE PROVIDING SOURCES FOR NARCOTICS IN THE PRISON? 
23 A. YES. I DID. 
24 Q. DID YOU GO IN THE COMPANY OF AN AGENT NAMED 
25 TERESA GABALDON? 
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A. YES, I DID. 
Q. ON THAT DATE DID YOU HAVE OCCASION TO GO TO 
AN APARTMENT LOCATED ON APPROXIMATELY FIFTH EAST 
JUST SOUTH OF 33RD SOUTH. I BELIEVE IT WAS THE 
APARTMENT OF JEANETTE APPLEMAN? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. NOW, DID YOU HAVE OCCASION TO GO INTO 
MS. APPLEMAN'S APARTMENT WHILE TERESA GABALDON 
REMAINED IN THE CAR? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND WERE YOU AWARE THAT MS. GABALDON AND 
JEANETTE APPLEMAN WERE ATTEMPTING TO MAKE CONTACT 
WITH SOMEONE TO SEE IF THEY COULD ARRANGE THE 
PURCHASE OF COCAINE? 
A. YES. 
Q. WHILE YOU WERE IN THE APARTMENT, DID 
SOMEONE COME TO THE APARTMENT AND MAKE SOME CONTACT 
WITH HE YOU THERE? 
A. YES, THEY DID. 
Q. WAS ANYONE ELSE IN THE APARTMENT AT THE 
TIME? 
A. THERE WAS. 
Q. WHO WAS THAT? 
A. MR. CHACON AND A COUPLE OF CHILDREN. 
Q. DID SOMEONE ELSE COME TO THE APARTMENT? 
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1 A. YES, THEY DID. 
2 Q. WHO WAS THAT? 
3 A. MR. MAESTAS. 
4I Q. MR. MAESTAS? 
5 A. AND ANOTHER FELLOW. 
6I Q. ANOTHER PERSON? 
7 A. YES. 
81 Q. WHEN THEY CAME TO THE APARTMENT, WHAT DID 
9 THEY DO? 
10 A. THEY COME AND ASKED FOR JEANETTE, AND WE 
11 SAID THAT SHE WAS MAKING A PHONE CALL TRYING TO GET 
12 SOME COCAINE. 
13 Q. WHAT HAPPENED THEN? 
14 A. HE PULLED OUT A LITTLE BAG AND SAYS, "I 
15 HAVE THIS RIGHT HERE." 
16 Q. WHO SAID THAT? 
17 A. MR. MAESTAS. 
18 Q. NOW, HE SAID WHAT? 
19 A. HE PULLED OUT A LITTLE BAG AND SAYS, "I 
20 HAVE THIS."THIS. 
21 Q. "I HAVE THIS"? 
22 A. YES. ASKED ME I WAS A COP. 
23 Q. AND WHAT DID YOU TELL HIM? 
24 A. I TOLD HIM I WASN'T. 
25 Q. WHAT DID YOU TELL HIM THAT YOU WERE, IF 
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1 ANYTHING? 
2 A. ON A HOME VISIT.. 
3 Q. THEN WHAT HAPPENED? 
4 A. WELL, WHEN HE BROUGHT OUT — HIS FRIEND 
5 LEFT. HE SHOWED ME THE COCAINE, AND I GAVE HIM ONE 
6 HUNDRED DOLLARS. HE SAYS, "WELL, I'M GOING TO GO." 
7 AND HE LEFT. 
8 I WENT IN THE BATHROOM, BECAUSE I WAS 
9 WIRED, AND TOLD LEO AND THEM TO GET THE TWO MEXICANS 
10 THAT LEFT THE APARTMENT BUILDING. 
11 Q. WHERE DID YOU OBTAIN THE MONEY? FROM LEO? 
12 A. YES, SIR. 
13 Q. HAD YOU BEEN SEARCHED PRIOR TO THIS 
14 OPERATION BEGINNING? 
15 A. YES. 
16 Q. WHO DID THAT SEARCH? 
17 A. LEO LUCEY. 
18 Q. WERE YOU SEARCHED AFTER THE OPERATION? 
19 A. YES. 
20 Q. AND WAS THAT BY ALSO LEO? 
21 A. YES. 
22 Q. NOW, AFTER YOU OBTAINED THE ALLEGED 
23 COCAINE, AND INDICATED ON THE WIRE THAT IT HAD 
24I HAPPENED, WHAT DID YOU DO THEN? 
25 A. JUST REMAINED IN THE APARTMENT. 
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Q. THEN WHAT HAPPENED? 
A. THEN WE — I GUESS THEY WENT AND PULLED HIM 
OVER. THEN SOME RELATION OF HIS LIVES NEXT DOOR, 
AND WE WERE GIVEN SOME MARIJUANA FROM THEM. 
Q. WHAT DID YOU DO WITH THE COCAINE? 
A. I TOOK IT DOWN TO TERESA AND GIVE TO HER. 
Q. YOU GAVE IT TO HER? 
A. YES. 
Q. THEN DID YOU GO BACK TO THE APARTMENT? 
A. YES. 
Q. I WILL SHOW YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AS 
EXHIBIT TWO FOR IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES. IF YOU'D 
JUST LIKE TO LOOK AT THAT. DOES THAT APPEAR TO BE 
THE SAME OR SIMILAR TO THE PACKAGE THAT YOU OBTAINED 
FROM MR. MAESTAS? 
A. YES. 
MR. SHEPHERD: THANK YOU. I HAVE NO 
FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
BY MR. GORDON: 
Q. WERE YOU USING DRUGS THAT DAY? 
A. NO. 
Q. HAVE YOU USED DRUGS IN THE PAST? 
A. YES, I HAVE. 
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Q. SO YOU KNOW WHAT THEY LOOK LIKE? 
A. YES, I DO. 
Q. HAVE YOU USED ANY DRUGS SUBSEQUENT TO THAT? 
MR. SHEPHERD: I OBJECT. I DON'T THINK 
THAT'S RELEVANT TO THIS. 
THE COURT: WHAT'S THE RELEVANCE? 
MR. GORDON: WELL, IT'S A CONTINUING 
PATTERN. HE'S A HABITUAL USER, AND I WANTED TO SHOW 
THAT. 
THE COURT: SUSTAINED. YOU DON'T NEED TO 
ANSWER THE QUESTION. 
Q. (BY MR. GORDON) ARE YOU CURRENTLY SERVING 
TIME ON A DRUG-RELATED OFFENSE. 
A. NO, I'M NOT. 
Q. OKAY. WHEN DID YOU HAVE YOUR HOME VISIT? 
WHY DID YOU TAKE YOUR HOME VISIT TIME TO INVOLVE 
YOURSELF IN — IN A RISKY KIND OF PROJECT? 
A. I WAS — MR. LEO SAID HE'D WRITE ME A GOOD 
RECOMMENDATION TO THE BOARD. 
Q. SO YOU WERE PROMISED A GOOD RECOMMENDATION 
IF YOU HELPED OUT? 
A. I WAS PROMISED A LETTER. THAT WAS IT. 
Q. NOW— 
THE COURT: MR. WALDRON, YOU NEED TO KEEP 
YOUR VOICE UP. IT'S HARD TO HEAR YOU. 
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1 THE WITNESS: OKAY. 
21 Q. (BY MR. GORDON) NOW LET ME ASK YOU— LET 
3I ME SEE — DESCRIBE TO ME WHAT HAPPENED ON THAT 
41 PARTICULAR DAY? YOU STARTED OUT AT WHAT, ABOUT 
51 EIGHT O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING? 
6I A. YES. 
7I Q. YOU WERE SEARCHED AT EIGHT O'CLOCK IN THE 
81 MORNING? 
9 A. YES. 
10 Q. OKAY. AND HOW MUCH MONEY WERE YOU GIVEN? 
11 A. I THINK IT WAS THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS. 
12 Q. AND A WIRE WAS PLACED ON YOU AT THAT TIME? 
13 A. YES, IT WAS. 
14 Q. HOW MANY TIMES WERE YOU SEARCHED THAT DAY? 
15 A. APPROXIMATELY FIVE. 
16 Q. WHAT KIND OF SEARCH WAS THAT? 
17 A. PAT DOWN. 
18 Q. PAT DOWN? 
19 A. I TOOK MY SHOES OFF. 
20 Q. SO THEY DIDN'T REALLY — NO BODY CAVITIES 
21 WERE SEARCHED ON ANY OF THOSE? 
22 A. NO. 
23 Q. NO. OKAY. LET ME ASK YOU THIS. YOU WERE 
24 SITTING UP IN AN APARTMENT AT THE VILLA FRANCHAIS, 
25 MAYBE AROUND NOON, EVERYBODY HAD GONE. YOU WERE 
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WATCHING CHILDREN? 
A. I WAS WITH MS. CHACON. 
Q. SHE FINALLY LEFT, AND YOU WERE BY YOURSELF? 
A. NO. SHE NEVER LEFT. 
Q. THERE WAS NO TIME THAT YOU BY YOURSELF? 
A. NO, THERE WASN'T. 
Q. LET ME — SO IF I CAN REFRESH YOUR MEMORY, 
YOU ARE SPEAKING OVER THE WIRE AND YOU'RE SAYING, 
"HOWRE YOU DOING? I AM TALKING TO A BABY, SO YOU 
DON'T THINK I AM HERE TALKING TO MYSELF." 
A. YES. MS. CHACON WAS IN THE BATHROOM. 
Q. SHE WAS IN THE BATHROOM, SO YOU WERE ACTUAL 
BY YOURSELF, HUH? 
A. IN THE LIVING ROOM. YES. 
Q. HUH? 
A. YES. I WAS TEN FEET AWAY FROM HER. 
Q. THIS SAYS, "TERESA AND THE LADY THAT LIVES 
HERE WENT TO GO PAGE THE GUY TO GET SOME COKE." 
A. YES. 
Q. DO YOU RECALL THAT? 
A. YES. 
Q. "THEY SHOULD BE BACK IN A MINUTE. THEY 
HAVE GOT ME HERE LISTENING TO NIGGER MUSIC." DO YOU 
REMEMBER THAT? 
A. YES. 
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1 Q. DO YOU REMEMBER SAYING THAT? 
21 A. YES, I DO. 
31 Q. WHY WOULD YOU MAKE A STATEMENT LIKE THAT? 
41 DO YOU HAVE A PROBLEM WITH BLACK PEOPLE? MEXICANS? 
5 A. NO. I LIVE WITH THEM. 
61 Q. THAT WAS PLAIN LANGUAGE. FROM WHEN YOU ARE 
7 I IN PRISON? 
81 A. YES. 
91 Q. WERE YOU EVER STRIPPED? 
10 A. WHEN I WENT TO PRISON — BACK TO PRISON 
11 THAT NIGHT, YES, I WAS. 
12 Q. BUT YOU WEREN'T STRIPPED DURING THE DAY? 
13 A. NO. 
14 Q. WHY WERE YOU RECRUITED? DID YOU VOLUNTEER? 
15 A. YES. 
16 Q. YOU VOLUNTEERED FOR THIS PROJECT. 
17 A. YES. 
18 MR. GORDON: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
19 MR. SHEPHERD: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
20 THE COURT: MAY MR. WALDRON BE EXCUSED, 
21 THEN? 
22 MR. SHEPHERD: I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THAT. 
23 MR. GORDON: NO. 
24 THE COURT: THANK YOU, MR. WALDRON. YOU 
25 MAY STEP DOWN. YOU MAY BE EXCUSED. 
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MR. SHEPHERD: ASK LEO LUCEY TO COME IN 
PLEAS. 
LEO LUCEY. 
CALLED AS A WITNESS, BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS 
EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SHEPHERD: 
Q. WILL YOU STATE YOUR FULL NAME, PLEASE. 
A. LEO S. LUCEY. 
Q. WHERE ARE YOU EMPLOYED? 
A. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF UTAH. 
Q. HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS? 
A. FIVE YEARS. 
Q. WHAT IS YOUR PRESENT ASSIGNMENT? 
A. I'M AN INVESTIGATOR FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS. 
Q. HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN EMPLOYED AS AN 
INVESTIGATOR? 
A. A LITTLE OVER A YEAR. 
Q. WHAT SORT OF TRAINING HAVE YOU HAD, AND 
BACKGROUND THAT QUALIFIES YOU FOR THAT POSITION? 
A. I'M A CERTIFIED PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE 
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